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PHILLIPS V. AWH: CHANGING THE NAME OF THE
GAME1
I. INTRODUCTION
Like many other forms of intellectual property protection, a
patent creates a limited property right – specifically, the right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing the claimed invention.2 In today’s marketplace, a wellinformed patent holder can use a patent both offensively and
defensively.3 When used offensively, a patent can generate new
revenues via licensing agreements or civil suits.4 When used
1. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rehearing en banc), 376 F.3d
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (order of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ordering the previous
judgment vacated and certifying seven questions for review). Amicus briefs were submitted on
September 24, 2004, and oral arguments were heard on February 8, 2004. Judge Giles S. Rich is
often quoted for the statement: “To coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claim.” Giles S.
Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims - American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990). In Phillips, the Federal Circuit has taken the
opportunity to reevaluate the methodology courts use to interpret patent claims. See infra note 86
(listing the seven questions heard in the en banc rehearing in Phillips).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore,
infringes the patent.”).
3. See Cynthia A. Lock, Patent Licensing and Litigation Strategies, in PATENT LICENSING
AND LITIGATION STRATEGIES 2004, at 643, 647-53 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 2004). See also John Carson et al., How to Effectively
Build and Protect Business Assets with a Strategic Patent Portfolio, 9 NO. 1 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULL. 1, 2 (2004) (“Strategic reasons for building a patent portfolio can be categorized as
offensive, defensive, or both.”).
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (providing courts with the power to grant monetary damages
that are “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty” and also providing for treble damages); see also 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2005) (giving courts the
power to grant attorney fees in “exceptional cases”); see also Carson, supra note 3, at 1 (“A
company can license its patented technology to competitors and generate revenue without incurring
production or sales costs.”). Pamela Banner Krupka detailed an interesting case study involving
how Ronald Katz utilized patent licensing to his benefit:
Katz holds dozens of United States patents, covering a wide range of interactive
technology including automated forms of customer service, securities trading,
merchandising, prepaid services, [and many others]. Katz has obtained numerous
licenses for financial services call processing patents, wherein customer service is

863

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 5
POTASHNIK1.DOC

864

6/1/2006 2:41:05 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:863

defensively, a patent can enjoin others from entering the market5 or
provide a shield against potential patents being issued to a company’s
competitors. 6 This dual-nature of patents has led to billion dollar
licenses, multi-million dollar infringement verdicts, and unprecedented
sales figures.7
For a relatively nominal cost, a patent attorney or patent agent
will draft a patent application for an inventor.8 A patent
provided to consumer and business accounts are delivered through automatic systems as
well as the combination of automated systems and live agents. Apparently suggesting
that any company with a call center must be using his patents, Katz has successfully
licensed his portfolio in the financial services and banking industry. Observers indicate
that Katz has generated millions of dollars licensing these patents alone.
Pamela Banner Krupka, Patent Licensing as a Source of Revenue, in PATENTS IN THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, at 235, 243 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 2004).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 283. See also Lock, supra note 3, at 653; Carson, supra note 3, at 1 (“A
patent portfolio can be the most effective way a business protects its assets and investments. By
carving out an exclusive market space for products and creating barriers to entry for competitors, an
effective patent portfolio can help deter competition in the marketplace.”).
6. Carson, supra note 3, at 2. When a new patent application is filed, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office searches prior patents and prior publications in the field (prior art) to
determine if the new application meets the requirements for patentability. Thus, a company’s issued
patents and other publications may preclude competitors from obtaining a patent, even if the
publication never becomes a patent. Id.
7. See, e.g., Gregory D. Hopp, IT Perspective: Questionable Claims Finding Some Success
in Court, BUS. INS., June 18, 2001, at G12 (noting that the largest verdicts in 2000 “included a
$324 million verdict in a patent infringement claim”). Legal newspapers have also reported on the
major patent infringement cases. See, e.g., Verdicts and Settlements: Plastics Firm Bags $102.38M
Patent Infringement Award, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 9, 1996, at A9; Verdicts and Settlement: GE Hit with
$111M Award in MRI Infringement Suit, NAT’L L.J., Jun. 19, 1995, at A13. See also Polaroid
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., l7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711 (D. Mass. 1991) (finding damages of $873
million). Polaroid was settled in July 1991 for $925 million, terminating the 15-year feud over
the patent rights regarding instant cameras and film. Kodak Settles with Polaroid, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 1991, at D8. See also Top 100 Verdicts of 2003, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 9, 2004, at S5 (listing top 100
jury awards for 2003).
8. An objective source for determining the cost of a patent comes from the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), whose most recent biennial survey of patent
prosecution costs states that the national median costs of preparing and filing provisional
applications were as follows: $2,993 for a provisional patent application; $10,001 for a “relatively
complex biotechnology/chemical” utility application; $9,995 for a “relatively complex electrical
computer” utility application; and $8,001 for a “relatively complex mechanical” utility
application, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2003, 88
tbl.21 (2003). As of the newest fee schedule, the $700 issue fee for a pro se applicant will
typically be the single largest expenditure assuming the applicant qualifies for “small entity”
status. (A pro se applicant is one who files the patent application without the help of a patent agent
or patent attorney). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2005), 37 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2005), and 37 C.F.R. § 1.18
(2005) (listing fees required in filing a patent application in the Patent and Trademark Office).
Other authorities suggest that if an inventor retains a patent attorney or patent agent, “it is common
for a patent application to cost $2,000-$3000 at the low end of the scale, or $10,000 to $15,000 for
a complex application.” Center for Business Planning, What a Patent Costs, available at
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application typically has three parts: a specification,9 drawings,10 and
a set of claims.11 It is the claims that define the patent owner’s property
right – the right to exclude.12 These claims are merely words that the
patent attorney has chosen to describe the invention.13 Because our
language is imprecise, courts must interpret the exact meaning of the
claims to determine specifically what a patent protects.14
http://www.businessplans.org/topic82.html (last visited Feb. 18. 2005). On the high end of the
scale for estimating the cost of a patent, other scholars have opined that prosecuting a patent
application averages from $10,000 to $30,000. Kimberly Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1544-55 (2003). Professor Moore states that “the bulk of the expenses
are spent drafting and prosecuting the claims, so more claims will raise prosecution fees.” Id.
9. United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#spec (last modified Jan. 2005).
The specification portion of the application is a detailed description of the invention and the
manner and process for making it. Id. The specification must be in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms to enable one skilled in the art to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2005).
10. United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/docgeneral/#drawing (last modified June 16, 2004). A
drawing is required whenever the nature of the case requires a drawing to understand the invention.
35 U.S.C. § 113 (2005).
11. United States Patent and Trademark Office. General Information Concerning Patents,
available at hitp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/#spec (last modified June 16, 2004)
(declaring that the claims are an important part of the application, because they define “the scope of
the protection afforded by the patent and which questions of infringement are judged by the
courts”).
12. See, e.g., Zenith Lab. Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (“It is the claim that sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of
the patent system.”).
13. MARTIN J, ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 525 (2d ed. 2003).
Generally, the particular words of a claim define a patent owner’s right to exclude others. Id.
However, a patent owner may also choose to incorporate the specification and drawings into the
claims by way of functional claiming. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003). The relevant portion of the statute
reads:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or act in
support thereof, and such claim shall he construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Id. This type of claiming is known as “functional claiming.” ADELMAN ET AL., supra, at 555-57.
By using the word “means” in a patent claim, an applicant establishes a presumption of meansplus-function (i.e., functional) claiming. Id. Claims in this format will be limited to the
embodiment described in the specification and shown in the drawings. Id. Thus, functional
claiming is one example where the express language of 35 U.S.C. § 112 dictates that the
specification and drawings must limit the scope of a patent’s claims. In Re Donaldson Co., 16
F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994). This is an exception to the general rule that the language of the
claims defines the bounds of the right to exclude.
14. In referring to statutory interpretation, Justice Frankfurter commented on the inexactness
of words:
Anything that is written may present a problem of meaning. . . . The problem derives
from the very nature of words. They are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathematical
symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains
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Courts interpret patent claims in pre-trial hearings commonly
referred to as Markman hearings.15 By giving the parties an early
and definitive claim interpretation, these hearings inform the parties
of the scope of the patent so the parties are in a better position to proceed
with settlement.16 Ultimately, early settlements help the parties avoid
full-blown patent litigation and its associated costs, which are typically
several million dollars.17
Recently, a split of authority concerning how courts carry out
these Markman hearings has arisen in the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).18 One line of cases adheres to the
view that courts should interpret a patent’s claims according to
the ordinary meaning of the claim language. 19 The opposing view
more than approximate precision. If individual words are inexact symbols, with shifting
variables, their configuration can hardly achieve invariant meaning or assured
definiteness.
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Readings of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528
(1947). See also Felix Frankfurter, A Re-Evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal
Courts, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1952).
15. E.g., Patricia Martone, Before the Actual Markman Hearing – Timing, Discovery, and
Alternatives, in HOW TO PREPARE & CONDUCT MARKMAN HEARINGS 2003, at 91, 97 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 2003).
16. Id. (“Conventional wisdom suggests that early claim construction promotes
settlement.’’). But see id. (“Magistrate Judge Thynge . . . stated that while claim construction had
a role in a couple of mediations she conducted, the magistrate judge was unable to identify a
consistent pattern of claim construction impact on settlement.”).
17. See AM. INTELLECTUAL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (2003). Patent
infringement suits are expensive. See id. Based on the dollar amount at risk in the patent
infringement suit, this survey categorized patent infringement suits into three categories: less than
$1 million at risk, $1-$25 million at risk, and more than $25 million at risk. Id. at 21. For these
suits, the total average cost per side was $500,000, $2,000,000, and $3,995,000, respectively. Id.
at 22. The average cost per side at the end of discovery was $290,000, $1,001,000, and
$2,500,000, respectively. Id. These costs include “outside legal counsel and paralegal services,
local counsel, associates, paralegals, travel and living expenses, fees and costs for court reporters,
photocopies, courier services, exhibit preparation, analytical testing, expert witnesses, translators,
surveys, jury advisors, and similar expenses.” Id. at 7. Thus, if courts can encourage parties to
settle prior to discovery, the parties could be spared significant litigation expenses. See id. at 22.
18. Craig A. Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH 1, 4-5 (2000)
(describing two claim construction approaches as “hypertexualism” and “pragmatic textualism,”
respectively). See also R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA.L.REV. 1105, 1111 (2004) (deeming
the two approaches “holistic” and “procedural” and undertaking a qualitative analysis of the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction methodology).
19. See Nard, supra note 18, at 4-5. Nard deems this approach “hypertexualist” approach,
and notes that it “stresses textual fidelity and internal textual coherence,” but eschews extrinsic
evidence as an interpretive tool, portraying its use as “rarely, if ever, “proper.” Id. at 5 (quoting
Vitrionics Corp. v. Cenceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d. 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A “hypertextualist”
judge rarely finds the claims, written description, and prosecution history ambiguous, and as such
rarely relies on expert testimony. Id. Wagner refers to this approach as the “procedural” approach
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favors looking to the written description and drawings to interpret
the claims.20 Because the Federal Circuit has almost exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals,21 this split of authority within the
Federal Circuit has made it difficult, if not impossible, for practitioners
to advise their clients on precisely what a given patent protects.22
Thus, in patent law, there is no issue more important than claim
construction.23 The fortunes of industry rise and fall on such rulings.24
The Federal Circuit granted an en banc hearing of Phillips v.
AWH Corp.25 to address the dichotomy existing in the Circuit’s
jurisprudence.26 Because of the impact of claim construction on every
litigated patent, Phillips has been deemed one of the most important
cases in patent law since the landmark case of Markman v. Westview
Instruments Inc. in the mid-1990s.27
In order to help the reader understand the implications of the case,
the remainder of this Note is divided into four sections. Section II
and notes that it is characterized by adherence to a relatively strict rules-based hierarchy of
interpretive source, with a particular emphasis on the ordinary meaning of disputed patent claim
language. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1111 n.19.
20. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1111 n. 19. Wagner refers to this approach
as the “holistic” approach and notes that it is a far less structured analysis. Id. Nard refers to this
approach as the “pragmatic textualist” approach and emphasizes that this approach considers the
relevance of extrinsic context and industry custom, while at the same time embracing the
importance of textual fidelity and internal coherence. Nard, supra note 18, at 5.
21. Matt Jamison, Comment, The On-Sale Bar and the New UCC Article 2: Arguments for
Defining a Commercial Offer for Sale Pursuant to the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH 351, 353 (2004). Following the creation
of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in only three cases dealing
with substantive patent issues. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme
Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 388 n.2 (2001).
22. Christine Hines, A Defining Moment for Patent Law: Court Mulls the Best Way to
Interpret Patent Claims, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004 (quoting Scott Doyle, a partner in the office
of Morrison & Foerster).
23. Brief for American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2, Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1269,-1286) [hereinafter ABA Amicus Brief].
24. Id.
25. Phillips v. AWH, 363 F.3d. 1207, (Fed. Cir. 2004), en banc reh’g granted, 376 F.3d 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
26. See generally infra notes 90-134 and accompanying text (referring to the section of this
note entitled “Statement of the Case”).
27. Hines, supra note 22, at 1 (“Phillips may be the most significant case to tackle the issue
of interpreting patent claims since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 ruling in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, which held that judges, not juries, should determine the meaning of patent.”). “The
decision has the potential not only to provide clarity for lawyers and their clients, but also to save
clients money and enhance predictability in the patent system.” Id. “‘This is the battleground on
which patent litigation is fought and won,’ said William Rooklidge, president-elect of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) and a partner at [Washington’s] Howrey
Simon Arnold & White.” Id. (quoting William Rooklidge).
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details the history and development of claim construction.28 Section I I I
discusses the Phillips case, including the relevant facts and procedural
history.29 Section IV analyzes the positions of the amicus briefs and
urges the Federal Circuit to adopt a balanced approach that looks to both
dictionaries as well as to the specification.30 Lastly, Section V provides
a conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background
Modern inventors typically hire patent attorneys to submit a patent
application31 to the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).32 If, after thorough examination, the USPTO believes that
the invention meets the statutory requirements,33 it will grant the
inventor a patent that is enforceable for a period of twenty years from
the original date of filing.34
Historically, in determining the scope of a patentee’s property
28. See generally infra notes 31-82 and accompanying text (referring to the section of this
note entitled “Background”).
29. See generally infra notes 90-134 and accompanying text (referring to the section of this
note entitled “Statement of the Case”).
30. See infra notes 135-225 and accompanying text (referring to the section of this note
entitled “Analysis”).
31. In this Note, the use of the term “patent application” (or “application”) is concerned with
only non-provisional utility patent applications. The term does not refer to provisional patent
applications, which are not required to include claims. 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(2).
32. See supra note 8 (describing common costs associated with hiring patent agents and
patent attorneys to file patent applications).
33. To obtain a patent, a patent application must meet the five basic requirements of
patentability:
1. The invention must fall within patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101;
2. The invention must be useful under 35 U.S.C. § 101;
3. The invention must be new or novel under 35 U.S.C. § 102;
4. The invention must be nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103; and
5. The application must meet the formal requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
BRENT A. OLSON, BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK, FORMATION AND OPERATION OF BUSINESSES §
17.3.01 (2004). See also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.”); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003) (entitled “Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of
right to patent”); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003) (entitled “Conditions for patentability; non-obvious
subject matter”); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003) (entitled “Specification”).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2002) (“Term.—subject to the payment of fees under this title, such
grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from
the dates on which the application for the patent was filed.”).
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right, courts have given different weight to the various portions of the
patent.35 Patent claims, as we currently understand them, “did not exist
until the early 1800s, did not receive formal legal recognition until
1836, and were not required of all patentees until 1870.”36 Thus, early
courts turned to the specification to interpret the metes and bounds of
the invention.37 More recently with the Patent Act of 1952, Congress
mandated that the “specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter. . . [of] the invention.”38 Courts have interpreted this language to
indicate that the claims of a patent define the patentee’s property right.39
Typically in patent litigation, interpreting a patent’s claims and
determining whether a product infringes upon those interpreted claims
has been a factual determination for the fact-finder.40 From the
perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, the fact-finder
interpreted the meaning of the claims using the specification and
drawings in the patent.41 Then the fact-finder decided whether or not
the allegedly infringing product did, in fact, infringe on the patent.42
Because of the complex scientific and legal issues involved, claim
interpretation was particularly difficult for lay juries.43 Accordingly,
35. See infra notes 36-44, and accompanying text (giving a brief historical overview of how
courts discerned the property right that a patent defines).
36. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1120. Patent claims did not exist in the modern
sense until the early 1800s. See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent
Claims. 46 MICH. L REV. 755, 758 (1948). As a historical matter, Robert Fulton’s patent on the
steamboat is generally credited with the “first example of real patent claims in the modern sense.”
Id. at 758. See also id. (opining on a humorous note that “Fulton might more properly be credited
with the invention of the ‘claim’ than of the steamboat”); Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of
U. S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 136 (1938) (naming Fulton’s patent as “the first real
‘claim,’ in the modern patent meaning”). Claims did not gain formal recognition until 1836.
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1120 (citing the Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat.
117, 119). Claims were not required in patent applications until 1870. Id. (citing the Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201).
37. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1120. Interestingly enough, the Phillips
decision may ultimately shift weight from the inventor’s claims towards the language in the
specification. See infra note 86 (listing the questions for rehearing in Phillips). As such, Phillips
may signal the start of the pendulum swinging back towards an era of patent law in which the
language of the claims is given less weight. See id.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
39. See, e.g., MILLS, JOHN GLADSTONE, ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS § 14.2 (analogizing the
claims of a patent to a real property deed that stakes out the owner’s property right).
40. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 749.
41. Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996).
42. Id.
43. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 749. See generally Marvin J. Garbis, Some American
and Australian Judicial Approaches to Scientific and Technological Issues, 22 AM. L. INST.-AM.
B. ASS’N 429 (2004). Speaking on the difficulty of such evidence for judges as well as juries,
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jury trials were somewhat rare before Congress established the
Federal Circuit.44
B. Markman Creates a Framework
The lack of procedural rigor in the previous two-hundred years set
the stage for the monumental case of Markman v. Westview
Instruments. 45 In Markman, the Federal Circuit adopted a two-step
process for determining patent infringement: (1) the judge
determines the scope and meaning of the patent’s claims, and (2) the
fact finder compares the allegedly infringing device to these judicially
construed claims.46 In the first step, the “claim construction step,” the
interpretation of the patent claims is a matter of law for the judge to
decide,47 and is reviewed de novo on appeal.48 In the second step, the
fact finder, either a jury or the judge, compares these judicially
Justice G.L. Davies of the Court of Appeal, Queensland, Australia, said:
Scientific and technical evidence has increased dramatically [since the 1960’s] both in its
frequency and its complexity; and the difficulty of a trier of fact, whether judge or jury,
in understanding and consequently in assessing the reliability of such evidence, though
not a new problem, has now become a critical one . . . . [T]here is now a good deal of
such evidence that is quite beyond the capacity of most judges to understand. And in
many cases in which a judge has some capacity to understand the evidence he or she will
lack the capacity to decide between competing opinions. Nevertheless, here and
elsewhere, judges continue to decide such questions on the apparent assumption that they
have the capacity to do so.
Justice G. L. Davies, The Changing Face of Litigation, 6 J. OF JUD. ADMIN. 179, 188 (1997). But
see Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Mayer, C.J.,
concurring in judgment) (noting that juries routinely render verdicts in civil and criminal cases
involving complex scientific evidence of equal or greater complexity than seen in patent cases).
44. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 13.
45. Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
46. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454.
47. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. This first step was deemed necessary because a judge
typically has more experience in interpreting legal instruments than a lay jury. Id. at 388-89. Cf.
supra note 43 (discussing various authorities’ opinions on the difficulties that technical evidence
presents for judges and juries).
48. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456 (“[W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we
review claim construction de novo on appeal . . . .”). However, even the Supreme Court has
noted the difficult distinctions between legal and factual issues. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (noting the difficult distinction between legal and factual issues).
Some scholars have criticized this aspect of Cybor’s holding. See John F. Duffy, On Improving the
Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109,
122-23, 166 nn.51-53 (2000) (opining that Cybor’s choice between standards of review “cannot be
made on the basis of metaphysical distinctions between fact and law”). Even the Markman
decision suggests that Cybor’s result may be flawed. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 378 (“[T]he
sounder course, when available, is to classify a mongrel practice [like claim construction] by using
the historical method. . . .”); see also id. at 384 (noting the difficulty of drawing the fact/law
distinction in claim construction).
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constructed claims to the allegedly infringing device.49 To find
infringement, the fact-finder must determine that every element of a
claim or its equivalent exists in the allegedly infringing device.50
Markman’s innovation rested in its first step.51 This first step,
known as a “Markman hearing,” was to be carried out in a full-blown
trial.52 The hope was that parties would be more likely to settle once
they had a definitive claim construction ruling in hand,53 and would
thereby avoid the enormous costs associated with patent
litigation.54 Concerning this critical “claim construction” step, the
Markman court declared that, “claims must be read in view of the
specification, of which they are a part.”55 The court further stated, “The
written description part of the specification does not delimit the right to
exclude. That is the purpose and function of claims.”56 Put more
simply, Markman states that a judge cannot read limitations from the
specification into the claims when performing claim construction.57
49. Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (1998).
50. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
51. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 370. This step is known more commonly as a “Markman
hearing.” Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1 1 1 8 . Markman hearings (i.e., claim
construction rulings) are issued before trial because the Federal Circuit hoped that this would lead to
more settlements once parties had a firm claim interpretation in hand. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note
13, at 757. The goal was to reduce the number of cases culminating in expensive trials. Id. For
more information on Markman hearings, see, e.g. William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting
to Markman: A Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 55, 59 (1999).
52. See supra note 15 (referring to Markman hearings).
53. See supra note 16 (noting that there are contrasting views on whether claim construction
actually accomplishes this goal).
54. See supra note 17 (detailing the enormous costs associated with patent litigation, which
can typically average in excess of $2 million dollars per side).
55. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 774 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
56. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. See also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is always necessary to review the specification to determine
whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.”)
Pre-Markman cases also reiterate this theme. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, 9 F.3d 948,
950 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It is improper for a court to add ‘extraneous’ limitations to a claim, that is,
limitations added ‘wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular
words or phrases in a claim.’”) (quoting E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (“That claims are interpreted in light of the specification does not mean that everything
expressed in the specification must be read into all the claims.”); Environmental Designs, Ltd. v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The claim, not the specification,
measures the invention. Environmental’s argument that claim 1 must include a limitation found in
the specification is thus legally unsound.”) (citation omitted).
57. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 774 (“In Markman, the Federal Circuit reiterated the
standard doctrine that ‘[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’”
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Although this rule appeared simple on its face, post-Markman decisions
would soon show it to be anything but straightforward.58
C. Post-Markman Jurisprudence
In the decisions following Markman, the Federal Circuit tried to
develop its claim construction doctrine to aid practitioners.59
Ultimately, the post-Markman decisions revealed that Markman’s
rule that “a judge cannot read limitations from the specification into the
claims” was at odds with other rules to which the court adhered.60 This
contradiction led to courts using seemingly inconsistent methods of
claim construction, causing unpredictable results.61 Indeed, in recent
years lawyers and academics have found the Federal Circuit’s reversal
rate for these district court decisions surprisingly high.62
Practitioners have complained that these contradictions make “it
difficult to provide your client clear guidance in terms of what their
patent claims actually mean.”63
1. Canons of Construction
After Markman, a number of canons largely governed claim

(quoting Markman 52 F.3d at 979)).
58. See generally infra notes 59-89 (referring to the section of this note entitled “Post
Markman Jurisprudence”).
59. See infra notes 60-76 (discussing some of these post-Markman decisions). Note that
many scholars believe that the court has failed to sufficiently aid practitioners in this arena. See
infra notes 61-62 (discussing the high reversal rates that make it nearly impossible to tell a client
what a particular patent’s claim means).
60. See infra notes 64-65 (listing this and several other canons of claim construction, and then
noting that there is even a canon to avoid the use of canons).
61. See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim
Construction Trend, 16 BERKLEY TECH., L.J. 1075, 1090 (2001) (finding that the Federal Circuit
overturned district court constructions in nearly 40% of cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District
Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2001) (finding the
Federal Circuit overturned district court claim constructions in 33% of cases); Hines, supra note 22,
at 1 (stating “about 40 percent of claim construction cases are reversed by the Federal Circuit”).
62. See supra note 61 (discussing various studies showing high reversal rates in claim
construction rulings). Many scholars have suggested innovations in claim interpretation that
might solve these problems. See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of
Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 357 (2001) (opining that the Federal Circuit
should accept interlocutory appeals of claim construction rulings in order to promote certainty and
efficiency); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Fact and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003) (surmising that the Federal Circuit has engaged in
fact finding to the detriment of the patent system).
63. Hines, supra note 22, at 1 (quoting Scott Doyle, a partner in the office of Morrison &
Foerster).
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construction analysis.64 However, as the Federal Circuit itself has
noted, many, if not all, of these canons are contradictory and not
especially useful.65
2. A More Rigorous Framework
In Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., the Federal Circuit
developed a more rigorous claim construction framework to supplement
the well-established canons of construction.66 The general framework
consisted of first focusing on the intrinsic evidence,67 then looking to
extrinsic evidence68 to the extent that the intrinsic evidence is
64. See, e.g., Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1341-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(discussing the canons of construction the Federal Circuit utilizes in claim construction). Five of
the more frequently invoked canons are listed below:
1. If possible, claims should be construed in a manner that preserves their validity. ACS
Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
2. If two plausible constructions exist, a court should choose the narrower as a
penalty for the patentee’s drafting ambiguity.
Vicki S.Veenker, Claim
Construction, the Current Structure of Legal Analysis, in PATENT LITIGATION 2004, at
11, 37 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series, 2004).
3. Courts should not import limitations from the specification into the claims.
Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
4. A patentee may act as his own lexicographer and create new words or assign a special
meaning to a word. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1996). If a patentee acts as his own lexicographer, he or she must describe
the word’s special meaning with reasonable clarity and precision. Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Articulate Sys., 234 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“For words with ordinary
meaning, it may be necessary for the applicant to clearly point out how the term in the
patent differs from conventional understanding.”).
5. Courts presume that each claim of a patent has a different scope. Amgen, Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See generally Veenker, supra, at 33-41 (citing these and several other canons of claim construction).
65. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1119 n.49 (citing Autogiro Co. of Am. v.
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967), for the proposition that the patent law features
canons to avoid the use of canons).
66. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1576. In Vitronics, the patentee brought an action against the
competitor, alleging infringement of its patented method of soldering devices to printed circuit
boards. Id. at 1579. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that (1) within the meaning of the patent,
the term “solder reflow temperature” meant “peak reflow temperature” rather than “liquidus
temperature,” and (2) the trial court erred in relying on expert testimony in interpreting the claim.
Id. at 1579-80, 1585.
67. Intrinsic evidence was defined as the patent, including the claims, the specification, and, if in
evidence, the prosecution history. Id. at 1582.
68. Extrinsic evidence is external to the patent and prosecution history; it may include expert
and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and articles. Cheryl L. Johnson, Was
Markman Wrong in Tasking Judges with Claim Construction? The Promises and the Reality, in
HOW TO PREPARE & CONDUCT MARKMAN HEARINGS 2004, at 9, 29-30 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
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ambiguous.69 Procedurally, the steps of claim construction are often
recited as follows: courts always begin with the language of the
claims,70 then look to intrinsic evidence to make sure it is consistent
with the claims,71 then consider extrinsic evidence to verify that it is
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 2004). However, “whether
dictionaries are treated as intrinsic or extrinsic evidence is subject of much debate and conflicting
holdings.” Id. at n.54. Some cases treat the dictionary as intrinsic evidence. See Hill-Rom Co. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the first reason for upholding the
trial court’s interpretation of the term “cushion” was that the interpretation was consistent with the
dictionary meaning); Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (using dictionary definitions to determine claim meaning). However, the weight of
authorities for a period of time treated dictionaries as extrinsic evidence. Toro Co. v. White
Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300 (Fed Cir. 1999) (“Dictionaries are useful
additional sources, as is the guidance of technical/scientific experts and other relevant evidence.”);
Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Indentix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (refusing to give
weight to an inconsistent dictionary definition because the intrinsic record is clear); see also
Lawrence Pretty, Developments in Markman Jurisprudence, in PLI’S SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 371, 395-96, (PLI Patent, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 2000) (discussing the status of dictionary definitions
and the patent abstract as intrinsic evidence). However, in Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am., the
Federal Circuit held dictionaries and treatises were not extrinsic evidence, but were to be consulted
as aids to the court. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
69. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83. Specifically the Vitronics court stated:
It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should first look to
intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification
and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. . . . Extrinsic evidence may also be
considered, if needed to assist in determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in
the claims.
Id.
70. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc., v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
First and foremost, courts should give the words of a claim the full range of their ordinary
meaning. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Dictionaries may establish this ordinary meaning, so long as the definition does not “fly in the
face” of the patent disclosure. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp, 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). Accordingly, courts should use dictionaries as a starting point for claim construction.
Furthermore, the ordinary meaning of the claim’s terms should be viewed from the perspective of
one skilled in the relevant art at the time the claim was filed. Brief for American Intellectual
Property Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2, Phillips v, AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) [hereinafter AIPLA Amicus Brief]. Given this
premise, technical dictionaries should be preferred over general dictionaries, because they more
closely approximate the ordinary meaning that one skilled in the art would associate with the term.
Id. at 12. Moreover, the dictionaries that a court uses should be the edition published at the time
of the filed application to accurately reflect the knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time the
claim was filed. Id.
71. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366-67 (noting that after pinning down the relevant starting
point for claim construction by the use of dictionaries, the court should examine the intrinsic
evidence in the patent instrument to make sure it is consistent with the ordinary meaning
construction). Well-known exam study guides for law students adhere to the simple rule that
limitations from the specification should not be read into the claims. See STEPHEN M. MCJOHN,
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 173 (Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2003).
This book sets forth the rule as follows:
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consistent with the claims,72 and finally, review other statutory
requirements.73
Despite this more structural framework, tension still existed
between two of the generally accepted “canons” of claim construction:
“(1) that claims should be read in light of the specification of which
they are a part; and (2) that the meaning of the claims may not be
altered by importing or reading-in changes from outside the claims.”74
To resolve this tension, in Johnson Worldwide Associates v. Zebco
Corp., the Federal Circuit mandated a “heavy presumption” in favor of
the ordinary meaning of a patent’s terms.75 The court further stated that
such ordinary meaning will not be overcome unless there is clear
evidence of a contrary meaning in the written description.76
[After looking at the claims], [t]he court next looks to the written description, the
drawings, and anything else in the patent. Because the claims define the invention, courts
try to avoid redefining them by using the rest of the patent. In particular, there is a
widely noted tension between interpreting the claims by using the written description
(allowed) and reading limitations from the description into the claims (not allowed).
Id. The distinction between interpreting the claims by using the written description and reading
limitations from the description into the claims, however, is a fine line to draw. ADELMAN ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 774-75 (“The distinction between ‘reading claim terms in light of the
specification’ and the prohibited practice of ‘importing limitations from the specification into the
claims,’ is not easy to draw.”) (citation omitted).
72. If the applicant amended his claims in the prosecution history, then the amended claims
must be construed narrowly and are limited to the embodiment shown in the specification and
drawings of the patent. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd., 535 U.S. 722,
739-40 (2002) (holding that a presumption exists that amended claims are to be construed
narrowly).
73. See Veenker, supra note 64, at 23-28 (discussing a general claim construction
methodology).
74. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1133.
75. 175 F.3d at 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The court noted:
We begin, as with all claim interpretation analyses, with the language of the claims.
The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be given their ordinary
and accustomed meaning. General descriptive terms will ordinarily he given their full
meaning; modifiers will not be added to broad terms standing alone. In short, a court
must presume that the terms in the claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise
compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms. In
order to overcome this heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of the
claim language . . . there must be a textual reference in the actual language of the
claim with which to associate a proffered claim construction.
Id. at 989-90 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 990. Johnson specifically lists two situations where a term will be given a
definition other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. Id. The first instance is when the
patentee has chosen to be his or her “own lexicographer by clearly setting forth an explicit
definition for a claim term. The second is where the term or terms chosen by the patentee so
deprive the claim of clarity that there is no means by which the scope of the claims may be
ascertained from the language used. In these two circumstances, a term or terms used in the claim
invites - or indeed, requires - reference to intrinsic, or in some cases, extrinsic evidence to
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3. A Split of Authority Appears
Despite this “heavy presumption” that Johnson Worldwide
Associates afforded the ordinary meaning of claim language, a
noticeable rift appeared in Federal Circuit claim construction
jurisprudence.77 This divide was created while the courts were trying to
resolve a pair of canons of claim construction: (a) that claims are to be
interpreted in light of the specification or prosecution history, and (b)
that claims may not be modified beyond their actual language by
reference to the specification or prosecution history.78 Professor Polk
Wagner opines that resolution of these canons ultimately resulted in two
distinct claim construction approaches: the “holistic” approach and the
“procedural” approach.79
The “holistic” line of cases states that claim terms must be read in
view of the patent specification of which they are a part.80 “[This]
approach . . . moves away from the abstract ‘ordinary meaning’ of a
term in favor of a more localized understanding” taken from the entire
instrument.81
The “procedural” approach (also known as the “ordinary meaning”
approach) begins “with a general presumption in favor of the ordinarily
determine the scope of the claim language.” Id. (citations omitted).
77. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1133.
78. Id. SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2001), similarly dealt with a conflict between these two conflicting canons of
interpretation. David J.F. Gross & Theodore M. Budd, “We Have a Split Decision”: Analyzing the
Internal Conflicts Within the Federal Circuit on the Issue of Claim Construction, in PATENT
LITIGATION 2004, at 55, 69 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series, 2004). In SciMed, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had properly
interpreted the claim in light of the specification because numerous statements in the patentee’s
specification disclaimed a broader interpretation of the claims. See id. at 69. As such, SciMed
seems to fall into the “holistic” methodology. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text
(discussing the “holistic” approach).
79. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1119, 1136. The Federal Circuit generally
reviews appeals in three-judge panels. Gary D. Krugman, Review of the Board’s Decision—
Appealing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2:50 (2003), TTABPP § 2:50 (Westlaw). Professor Wagner
undertook a quantitative study of how the panels of the Federal Circuit ruled on claim construction
causes. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1111. Ultimately, Professor Wagner found that
the various panels of the Federal Circuit used distinctly different methodologies that depended on
which judges sat on the panel. Id. at 1111-12.
80. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1133. The holistic approach “adopts a
distinctly more free-form approach, seeking the correct meaning according to the particular
circumstances presented. . . .” Id. at 1134. This methodology moves away from the “ordinary
meaning” of a term in favor of a more localized understanding. Id.
81. Gross & Budd, supra note 78, at 61. Gross and Budd deem this approach the “SciMed”
approach. Id.
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understood meaning of the claim language, which is ascertained from
dictionaries and encyclopedias.”82 One who wants to challenge the
ordinary meaning must establish such deviation with significant
evidence from the intrinsic record.83
4. Phillips Attempted Promises to Resolve this Quagmire
In Phillips, the Federal Circuit attempted to settle this jurisprudential
rift by utilizing a consistent method of claim construction.84
Accordingly, this decision will serve as a benchmark for all future claim
construction rulings.85 In Phillips, the Federal Circuit certified seven
questions for appeal.86 These questions address what evidence a court
82. Id. at 61-62. The procedural methodology starts with a general presumption in favor of
the ordinary meaning that follows a predetermined path of analysis wherein any suggested alteration
from the common meaning requires significant proof that such any alteration is required under the
circumstances. Id. Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp. provides an excellent example of
this approach:
We begin, as with all claim interpretation analyses, with the language of the claims. The
general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be given their ordinary and
accustomed meaning. General descriptive terms will ordinarily be given their full
meaning; modifiers will not be added to broad terms standing alone . . . . In order to
overcome this heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language . . .
there must be a textual reference in the actual language of the claim with which to
associate a proffered claim construction.
175 F.3d 985, 989-90 (Fed Cir. 1999).
83. Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
84. Gross & Budd, supra note 78, at 117.
85. See Hines, supra note 22, at 1 (“Phillips may be the most significant case to tackle the
issue of interpreting patent claims since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 ruling in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, which held that judges, not juries, should determine the meaning of
patent.”). The Phillips decision has the potential to provide clarity for lawyers and their clients,
but more importantly it may save clients money and enhance predictability in the patent system.
Id. “‘This is the battleground on which patent litigation is fought and won,’ said William
Rooklidge, President-elect of the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) and a
partner at Washington’s Howrey Simon Arnold & White.” Id.
86. 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Order of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
dated July 21, 2004). These seven questions are as follows:
1. When constructing patent claims, is public notice better served by looking to
definitions in technical dictionaries, general-purpose dictionaries, and other similar
sources, or by looking to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification? If both
sources are to be consulted, in what order should a court consult them?
2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary tool for claim interpretation, should the
specification limit the full scope of claim language (as defined by dictionaries) only
when the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification
reflects a clear disclaimer of claim scope?
3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification, what use
should be made of dictionaries?
4. Should courts treat the two approaches as complementary methodologies such that
there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must satisfy both limiting
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should look to in construing patent terms.87 For example, should courts
look to dictionaries (extrinsic evidence) or only to the specification and
drawings (intrinsic evidence)?88 While courts seem to disagree about a
precise methodology in this arena, practitioners have suggested that the
best claim construction analysis will strike the proper balance between
providing fair coverage for applicants and adequate notice to the public
of the patent’s limits.89
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Edward Phillips is the inventor and owner of U.S. Patent No.
4,677,798 (the ‘798 patent) relating to modular wall panels for
prisons. 90 “In 1989, [he] entered into an agreement with AWH
Corporation, Hopeman Brothers, Inc., and Lofton Corporation
(collectively “AWH”) [whereby AWH would] market and sell
Phillips’ invention.”91 The agreement ended in 1990, and in early
1991, Phillips became convinced that AWH had introduced a new
product that “continu[ed] to use Phillips’ technology without his
consent.”92
Throughout the specification, drawings, and claims of the ‘798
patent, Phillips describes his modular wall panels as having essentially
two components: (1) an outer steel shell, and (2) inwardly-extending
steel barriers similar to trusses on a bridge.93 When several of these
methodologies in order to establish the claim coverage it seeks?
5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole purpose
of avoiding invalidity under, e.g. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112?
6. What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of ordinary skill
in the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed claim terms?
7. Is it appropriate for an appellate court to accord any deference to any aspect of
trial court claim construction rulings?
Id.
87. See id.
88. See supra note 86 (stating the seven questions certified by the court).
89. AIPLA Amicus Brief, supra note 70, at 11.
90. U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed April 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987). The specification
portion of the patent refers to the panels’ heat, sound, and fire resistant properties, as well as their
propensity for projectile deflection. Id. Phillips suggests the invention is most useful in prison
walls. Id.
91. Phillips v. AWH, 363 F.3d. 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted, 376 F.3d 1382 (2004).
92. Phillips, 363 F.3d. at 1210.
93. See generally U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798.
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modular wall panels are pieced together to form a wall, the outer steel
shells adjoin to form the face of the wall and the inwardly-extending
steel barriers buttress the outer shells to increase the wall’s load bearing
capacities.94
The claims of the ‘798 patent refer to the internal steel barriers
as “baffles.” 95 The patent’s specification describes only “baffles” that
meet the steel walls at angles less than ninety degrees.96 Similarly, each
and every drawing of the ‘798 patent shows that the steel barriers meet
the steel shell at angles less than ninety degrees.97 However, while
the specification and drawings show only steel barriers intersecting
with the shell at angles of less than ninety degrees, the claims of the
patent recite no such limitation.98 The claims merely mention that the
modules contain “steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell
walls.”99
B. District Court Decision
In February 1997, Phillips brought an action against AWH,
contending that AWH had infringed several claims of his ‘798
patent with its new product and had misappropriated Phillips’
trade secrets.100 On the issue of misappropriation, the court disposed
of Phillips’ complaint and held that his claim was barred by
Colorado’s three-year statute of limitations.101 However, it proved
more difficult to dispose of the patent infringement claim.
94. Id.
95. Id. Claim 1 of the patent typifies the use of the word “baffle” and reads as follows:
1. Building modules adapted to fit together for construction of fire, sound and impact
resistant security barriers and rooms for use in securing records and persons, comprising
in combination, an outer shell of substantially parallel piped shaped with two outer steel
plate panel sections of greater surface area serving as inner and outer walls for a
structure when a plurality of the modules are fitted together, sealant means spacing the
two panel sections from steel to steel contact with each other by a thermal-acoustical
barrier material, and further means disposed of inside the shell for increasing its load
bearing capacity comprising internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell
walls.
Id. (emphasis added).
96. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1210.
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (quoting the specific claim language and
discussing the written description and drawings of the ‘798 patent).
99. See supra note 98 (quoting the exact language of the claims of the ‘798 patent). A plain
reading of this language implies this claim could include baffles which extend from the walls at
angles equal to ninety degrees. See U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798.
100. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1210.
101. Id.
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In determining whether infringement had occurred, the court
undertook an examination of AWH’s allegedly infringing modular
panels. This examination revealed that the AWH panels also had
“baffles,” but that AWH’s baffles extended inwardly from steel shell
walls at angles equal to ninety degrees.102 Therefore, in determining
whether infringement occurred, a key issue was the meaning of the word
“baffle” as used in the claims of Phillips’ patent.103 The district court
found that Phillips’s claims were in “means-plus-function format”104
and accordingly reasoned that the word “baffle” should be limited to
its structure in the specification.105 Therefore, the court construed the
term “baffle” in the claims of the patent to cover only steel structures
that extended inwardly from steel shell walls at angles less than ninety
degrees.106 Consequently, the court’s focus on the specification led it to
conclude that AWH’s product did not infringe Phillips’ patent.107 Phillips
appealed the decision.108
C. Appellate Panel Reviews Decision
On appeal, the three-judge panel109 reviewed the district court’s
decision de novo.110 The majority first reasoned that the claims were
not in means-plus-function format,111 and thus disregarded the district
court’s decision.112 Citing Webster’s Dictionary,113 the majority then
noted that the ordinary meaning of the word “baffle” is “something for
deflecting, checking, or otherwise regulating flow.”114 This ordinary
102. Id. at 1214.
103. See id. at 1215. If the court interpreted the claims of the ‘798 patent broadly (i.e., the
claims encompassed baffles extending inwardly at angles equal to ninety degrees), then AWH
would infringe the ‘798 patent. However, if the court read limitations into the claims from the
specification and drawings (i.e., the claims only encompassed baffles extending inwardly at angles
of less than ninety degrees), then no infringement would occur. Compare id. at 1207, with id. at
1216 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
104. See supra note 13 (describing means-plus-function format).
105. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1210.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1210-11.
109. Id. at 1209 (Circuit judges Newman, Lourie, and Dyk comprised the three-judge panel).
110. Id. at 1211 (citing Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1315
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
111. See supra note 13 (describing means-plus-function format).
112. Phillips, 363 F.3d at l212.
113. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 162 (1993)).
114. Id. At oral argument on Feb. 9, 2005, the court questioned which dictionary should be
used as follows:
Linn: If we use the dictionary, then which one, and what meaning(s) from that
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meaning encompasses baffles extending inwardly from steel shell
walls at angles equal to ninety degrees, and hence there was a
possibility for infringement.115 The majority then examined the
specification and noted that the specification showed baffles
exclusively at angles of less than ninety degrees.116 Because the
specification showed baffles only at angles of less than ninety degrees,
the majority discounted the ordinary meaning of “baffle” and reasoned
that Phillips’ patent did not extend to baffles of ninety degrees.117
Therefore, the panel concluded that AWH’s product did not infringe
Phillips’ patent.118
However, a powerful dissent focused on the fact that the
ordinary, dictionary meaning of the word “baffle” did not exclude a
structure that met the sidewall exactly at an angle of ninety degrees. 119
The dissent felt that the court should interpret Phillips’ claim
broadly to be consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word
“baffle.”120 Accordingly, the dissent reasoned that the district court’s
grant of summary judgment should be vacated because it was based on
an erroneous construction.121 Finally, the dissent cautioned that the
majority’s decision effectively limited the claims to the preferred
embodiment, contrary to established precedent.122
dictionary?
[Manthei for Edward Phillips] A: The parties should get deference. The patent owner
might propose multiple definitions, and the defendant would propose narrower
definitions. Then the court should narrow it down to two competing definitions. Then
we can run those through the specification. If they are both plausible, then OK.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 031269, -1286) available at http://ip-updates.blogspot.com/2005/02/phillips-v-awh-transcipt.html (last
visited on Feb 18, 2005) [hereinafter Oral Argument Transcript].
115. See Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1216-17 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 1214 (majority). See also Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 114, at 1, where
Judge Lourie states: “The only baffles disclosed in the specification are those that are numbered in
the figures and show an angle less than 90 degrees[.]”
117. See Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1213-14.
118. Id. at 1214.
119. Id. 1216-17 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
120. Id. See also supra note 113 (quoting the court’s inquiry as to which dictionary to use).
121. Id. at 1219.
122. Id. at 1217 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc, 358 F.3d 898, 907-08 (Fed. Cir.
2004)). Another case that illustrates the principle that claims should not be limited to the preferred
embodiment is CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In
CCS Fitness, Brunswick had patents relating to an elliptical exercise trainer. Id. at 1362. In using
the trainer, a user placed his feet on two footpads, each of which i s a t the end of a “foot member”
that connected to the vertical frame of the machine. Id. The claim of the patent was such that the
determination of infringement rested on whether “foot member” was made up of one part or two
parts. Id. The drawings and the specification showed only one part, however the claims of the
patent could reasonably be interpreted to include one or two parts. Id. Claims 1 and 2 of the
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Thus, the outcome of this case hinged on how courts should
interpret the words of a patent claim.123 If courts focus on the diagrams
and language of the specification, the patent claims of inventors will
be construed narrowly and inventors will own a more limited
property right.124 However, if courts look at a broad dictionary
definition of words in a patent claim, inventors will be entitled to a
broader, more encompassing property right.125
D. En Banc Rehearing
On July 21, 2004, the Federal Circuit granted a petition to rehear
the appeal en banc to resolve issues concerning the construction of
patent claims.126 The court certified seven questions for appeal.127 In
July of 2005, the Federal Circuit rendered its decision.128
In short, the Federal Circuit settled on a balanced approach in the

5,938,567 patent are representative:
1. An apparatus for exercising comprising: a frame having a base portion adapted to be
supported by a floor; first and second reciprocating members, each reciprocating
member having a rear support and a front end [;]
2. The exercise apparatus according to claim 1 wherein said rear support
comprises a roller attached to each reciprocating member and adapted to rollably
[sic] engage the base portion of said frame.
U.S. Patent No. 5,938,567 (filed Oct. 23, 1997) (issued Aug. 19, 1999) (emphasis added). The
CCS Fitness court held that the specification could not limit the scope of the claims. See CCS
Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. Therefore, the court reasoned that the claim should be given the
broadest interpretation that would be consistent with the claim. Id. If an apparatus claim recites a
general structure without limiting that structure to a specific subset of structures, courts will
generally construe the term to cover known types of that structure that the patent disclosure
supports. Id. The holding in Phillips is diametrically opposed to this rule. See Phillips 363 F.3d at
1214.
123. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion and the
dissent’s view as to which method of claim construction should apply to the case, respectively).
124. See Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 384 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(noting that the parties agreed that the extrinsic meaning of the term (as determined by treatises and
dictionaries) is broad). In Astrazeneca, the court eventually went on to hold that the patent’s
intrinsic evidence clearly limited Astrazeneca to a narrower definition of a claim than the extrinsic
evidence would support. Id. at 1338. Note that Astrazeneca explicitly remarked that it did not
resolve the issue of which approach is proper as a matter of law. Id. at 1338 n.3 (suggesting that the
en banc rehearing in Phillips may resolve this question). See infra note 125 (opining that if the court
looks to the specification, it will result generally in a narrower claim for the patentee).
125. If looking to a dictionary definition results in a broad meaning, then looking to the
specification must lead to a more narrow meaning. Cf. supra note 124 (discussing how the
Astrazeneca court looked to the specification to narrow a patent’s claims).
126. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F 3d. 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Amicus briefs were due on
September 24, 2004 and oral arguments occurred on February 8, 2005.
127. See supra note 86 (quoting the seven questions certified for review).
128. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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claim construction context.129 On the one hand, the court favored
looking to the specification and the prosecution history to define the
terms of the claim.130 On the other hand, the court still allowed for the
use of dictionaries in claim construction; however, the court
discounted the importance of dictionaries by noting, “[I]n Texas
Digital . . . the methodology [that the court] adopted placed too much
reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries. . . .”131 Conversely,
if the court leans in favor of the specification defining the terms of the
claim, claims will generally be construed more narrowly.132 As a
patent portfolio is a major asset of most large domestic and
international corporations,133 this decision has a direct bearing on the
assets of these companies. Moreover, time may tell whether the
court’s ruling in Phillips furthers the mandate of injecting
predictability and consistency into patent law.134
IV. ANALYSIS
This section answers the first question presented in the Phillips
en banc review, namely, “When constructing patent claims, is public
notice better served by looking to definitions in technical dictionaries,
general purpose dictionaries, and other similar sources, or by looking

129. See generally, id. Interestingly, when construing the patent’s claims, the court’s first step
started with claim differentiation, under each claim is given a meaning so as not to render any other
claim meaningless. See id, at 1324-25 (where the first two paragraphs in section IV compare and
contrast the various claims).
130. See id. at 1314-17. Specifically, the court noted that when the meaning of a claim term is
not “immediately apparent” to one of ordinary skill in the art, courts look to “those sources available
to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood the disputed claim
language to mean.” Id. at 1314. The sources include the words of the claims themselves, the
specification, the prosecution history, and the extrinsic evidence. Id.
131. Id. at 1320.
132. See supra note 124. If looking to a dictionary definition results in a broad meaning, then
looking to the specification must lead to a more narrow meaning. Cf. supra note 125 (where the
Astrazeneca court looked to the specification to narrow a patent’s claims).
133. See John R. Allison et al, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 436 (2004) (noting that
patent owners spend $4.33 billion per year to obtain patents). IBM reportedly generated over $500
million in 1999 in patent licensing fees. See LICENSING PRODS, & SERVS. GROUP, MARKET TREND
(2005), available at http://www.informationholdings.com/lps_files/market.html (last visited May
14, 2006). However, valuable patents (or more precisely, those that are litigated) come
“disproportionately from certain industries.” Allison et al., supra, at 438. For instance, patents in
the semiconductor and chemical industries are much less likely to be litigated than those in the
mechanical, computer and medical device industries. Id.
134. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 18, at 1108-09 (questioning the Federal Circuit’s
role of almost exclusive jurisdiction over patent law: “Has [it] resulted in clearer, more consistent,
more coherent rules surrounding patents?”).
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to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification?”135
Nearly forty amicus curiae filed briefs in the Phillips case.136 Part
A of this section briefly summarizes the positions of the amicus briefs
on the first Phillips question.137 Parts B and C present the positions
most commonly advanced by amicus curiae (identified as the “holistic”
and “procedural” approaches, respectively)138 and then discusses their
shortcomings.139 Lastly, after weighing the realistic concerns of the
amicus curiae, Part D suggests a methodology by which the court should
have to resolve this first Phillips question.140
A. Summary of the Amicus Briefs
Law firms, corporations, and professional organizations have
135. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F 3d. 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (vacating the previous judgment
and certifying seven questions for review by the Federal Circuit).
136. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (referring to the section of this Note entitled
“Summary of the Amicus Briefs”).
137. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (referring to the section of this Note
entitled “Summary of the Amicus Briefs”). The recent Federal Circuit decision of Astrazeneca
discusses the very crux of the issue in Phillips as follows:
It is axiomatic that the claims mark the outer boundaries of the patent right to exclude.
The critical challenge is to determine the meaning of the claims, i.e., their scope. A long
line of cases indicates that evidence intrinsic to the patent - particularly the patent’s
specification, including the inventors’ statutorily-required written description of the
invention - is the primary source for determining claim meaning, We have embraced this
proposition frequently. Indeed, that proposition has been accepted doctrine in patent law
for many years. See, e.g., Autogiro of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d. 391, 397-98 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) (“The use of the specification as a concordance for the claim is accepted by
almost every court and is a basic concept of patent law. Most courts have simply stated
that that the specification is to be used to explain the claims; others have stated the
proposition in different terms, but with the same effect.”); Musher Found, v. Alba
Trading Co., 150 F.2d 885, 888 (2d. Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (“As in the case of any other
claim, a product claim may, and indeed must, be read upon the specifications: its terms
are no more than a shorthand from the fuller explanation which the specification should
contain.”). On this view, the patent is an integrated document, with the claims “pointing
out and distinctly claiming” the invention described in the rest of the specification and
the goal of claim construction is to determine what an ordinary artisan would deem the
invention claimed by the patent, taking the claims together with the rest of the
specification.
384 F.3d 1333,1336-37 (footnote and most citations omitted).
138. See supra notes 18-20 (describing the “holistic” and “procedural” methodologies,
respectively, as outlined by Professor Wagner; as well as the “hypertexualist” and “pragmatic
textualist” approaches as urged by Professor Nard).
139. See infra notes 150-84 and accompanying text (referring to the section of this note
entitled “B. Minority - A Heavy Presumption in Favor of Dictionaries Provides the Best Notice”)
and notes 186-212 (referring to the section of this note entitled “C. Majority - Look to the
Specification”).
140. See infra notes 212-25 and accompanying text (referring to the section of this note entitled
“D. Suggestion - Include Dictionaries As Intrinsic Evidence”).
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cumulatively submitted thirty-four amicus briefs.141 Of course, Edward
Phillips and AWH Corp. have also filed briefs in the case.142 Of the
thirty-six briefs, twenty-five favored the “holistic” approach (69.5
percent)143 and five preferred the “procedural” approach (13.9 percent).144
141. See infra notes 143-146 (listing the individual briefs and categorizing them).
142. A total of thirty-six briefs were filed. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., available at
http://www.faegre.com/custom/page_2185.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
143. The following twenty-five briefs favor the “holistic” approach: ( 1 ) Brief for The
Intellectual Property Law Ass’n of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2-3,
Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“[D]ictionaries should in general be subordinate to
the patent specification and other intrinsic evidence when determining what is meant objectively
by challenged claim terms.”); (2) Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Phillips, 415 F.3d
1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“[R]eliance on the intrinsic evidence as the starting point for
interpreting claims preserves established doctrines of patent law, does not upset settled
expectations, and achieves a reading of patent claims that serves the public notice function of
claiming while remaining fair to the patentee.”); (3) AIPLA Amicus Brief, supra note 70, at 2, 5
(applying a “balanced approach,” but ultimately determining that “materials in the intrinsic record
must, throughout the inquiry be the ‘primary’ source for claim construction”); (4) DefendantsCross Appellants’ Additional Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 4, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 031269. -1286) (“Reference to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification, rather than to
dictionaries, best serves the public notice function of patent claims.”); (5) Brief for Ad Hoc
Committee of Patent Owners in the Wireless Industry as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party
at 2, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286), (“[P]resumptively construe claims to cover
those specific embodiments reasonably disclosed in the specification”); see also Intellectual
Property Law Ass’n of Chicago, available at http://iplac.org/Briefs/Summary_of_Positions.pdf at
3 (last visited January 20, 2005) (“Patentee has burden of public notice function”) [hereinafter
IPLAC Webpage]; (6) Brief for Ass’n of Corp. Council on Rehearing En Banc as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Neither Side at 2, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269,-1286) (“Public notice is best
served by first looking to the intrinsic evidence, including the claims, the specification, and the
prosecution history. Dictionaries and other extrinsic evidence are to be used only if the intrinsic
evidence does not determine the meaning of the claim.”) (emphasis added); (7) Brief for The Ass’n
of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 5, Phillips, 415
F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269,-1286) (“The public notice function of patent claims is better served by
construing the claims with reference to the patent specification, including the drawings, as well as
the file history.”); (8) Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 5, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303) (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“This public notice function is
better served if claim construction proceeds first by inspecting the specification. In those
instances when the specification affirmatively establishes the construction of a claim, the claim
construction task is at an end.”); (9) Brief of Boston Patent Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 11-12, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“[A]
dictionary . . . defines a term in the abstract, outside its context. . . . The necessary context for
the claimed invention can be found in the first instance in the specification and prosecution
history.”); (10) Brief for Charles W. Bradley, Esq. as Amicus Curiae at 1, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303
(Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“The mode of analysis that best serves the public notice function of patent
claims clearly includes an analysis of the specification and prosecution history of the patent at
issue.”) [hereinafter Bradley Amicus Brief]; ( 1 1 ) Brief of Conejo Valley Bar Ass’n as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 3, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“Only after a
review of the intrinsic record, the overall claim language, the specification and prosecution
history, should a court define the words in a claim using extrinsic evidence, such as a dictionary or
learned treatise.”); (12) Brief of Connecticut Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae
Regarding the Issue of Claim Construction at 3, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286)

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 5
POTASHNIK1.DOC

886

6/1/2006 2:41:05 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:863

(“The public notice function of patent claims is better served by referencing initially to the
patentee’s use of the term in the specification.”); (13) Brief of Federation Internationale des
Conseils en Propriete Industrielle as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 4, Phillips, 415
F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“[T]he ordinary meaning of the claim term to one of ordinary
skill in the art as used in the context of the patent shall apply [as a general rule]. . . .”); (14) Brief
of Houston Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Response to the Court’s Order
Inviting Briefs at 2, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“[T]he intrinsic record - the
claims, specification, and prosecution history (if in evidence) - should be referenced first.”); (15 )
Brief of Infineon Technologies North America Corp. as Amicus Curiae at 3, Phillips, 415 F.3d
1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (suggesting an approach that “looks first and foremost to the
specification to construe disputed claim terms”); see also IPLAC Webpage, supra, at 7 (“Look
first and foremost to spec’n [sic]; no role for dictionaries in defining claim terms; claim terms are
defined either explicitly or implicitly in spec’n [sic].”); (16) Brief for Intel Corp., IBM Corp. et al.
as Amici Curiae. at 3, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos, 03-1269, -1286) (“The more reasonable and
predictable course is to rely in the first instance on the specification and the prosecution history.”)
[hereinafter IBM Amicus Brief]; ( 1 7 ) Brief of Intellectual Property Owners Ass’n as Amicus
Curiae at 2, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“The primary evidence of claim
meaning is found in the patent specification and prosecution history, and no other evidence should
be considered if the claims can be construed property from those sources alone.”); (18) Brief for
Medrad, Inc. to Address the Questions Presented in this Court’s July 21 2004 Order as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (“Claim construction should be based
upon the intrinsic evidence, including the specification, drawings, prior art, and prosecution
history.”); see also IPLAC Webpage, supra, at 8 (“The spec’n [sic] and filed history should be
used first.”); (19) Brief for New York Intellectual Property Law Ass’n Regarding the Issue of
Claim Construction, in which the Tennessee Bar Ass’n, State Bar Michigan Law Section, & Los
Angeles Intellectual Property Law Ass’n Join as Amici Curiae at 3, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos.
03-1269,-1286) (“[T]he primary source of claim construction should be the intrinsic evidence —
namely the patent claims, patent specification and, if in evidence, the patent prosecution history.”);
see also IPLAC Webpage, supra, at 9 (stating “Spec’n [sic] first.”); (20) Brief for Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp. et al as Amici Curie at 2, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286)
(“[D]ictionaries are not preeminent, and should be used only as, and to the extent that, the skilled
person would use them. . . .”); (21) Brief for Oregon Patent Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae
Answering the Additional Questions Set Forth by the Court and by Circuit Judge Rader at 2,
Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“When construing claim terms, the patent statutes
require courts to look primarily at a patentee’s use of the term, thus requiring the courts to
examine the context of the use of the claim term and not just isolated, generalized dictionary
definitions.”); (22) Brief for San Diego Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 2,
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1269,-1286) (“The review of the
intrinsic evidence starts with the specification which is the best source for determining the proper
context for claim terms.”); (23) Brief for Sughrue Mion, PLLC as Amicus Curiae at 11-12,
Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“The patent document provides notice of a claim
term’s meaning. . . . [O]nly the patent specification and prosecution history can illustrate what
the claimed invention is not; whether because of disclaimer, disavowal or estoppel. A dictionary
cannot.”) [hereinafter Mion Amicus Brief]; (24) Brief for Visa U.S.A. & Mental, Inc. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Judgment at 6, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“The public
notice function is better served by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the context
of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history.”); (25) Brief for Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation., et al. as Amici Curiae at 3, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286)
(“The starting point for . . . claim construction . . . should be the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §
112, which sets forth the requirement that ‘[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more
claims. . . .’”) (emphasis added).
144. The following five briefs favor the “procedural” approach: (1) En Banc Brief of
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Three briefs suggested that the court look to both the specification and to
dictionaries (8.3 percent).145 The remaining three briefs did not address
the question (8.3 percent).146 Although the amicus curiae may agree on
some matters,147 this note focuses on two incongruous positions taken by
Plaintiff-Appellant Edward H. Phillips at 7, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (stating quite predictably that “claims . . . should be read first,
incorporating the parties’ stipulated definitions when they exist, definitions from authoritative
written sources for terms of art, and standard dictionary definitions for all other terms.”) (emphasis
added); (2) Brief for Ass’n of Patent Law Firms as Amicus Curiae, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos.
03-1269, -1286); see IPLAC Webpage, supra note 143, at 3 (“Dictionaries (technical and general)
should be primary source to identify ordinary meaning, then go to spec’n [sic].”); (3) Brief &
Appendix for McShea Tecce, P.C., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal at 2, Phillips, 415
F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (proposing a method that “first determines the full range of possible
definitions from standard English dictionaries or, if applicable, recognized technical publications”)
[hereinafter McShea Tecce Amici Brief]; (4) Brief for Parus Holdings Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 3,
Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Nos. 03-1269, -1286) (“The dictionary approach to claim construction
inherently provides uniformity and predictability because dictionaries provide only a few possible
meanings for any given claim term.”) [hereinafter Parus Holdings Amicus Brief]; (5) Brief for
Patent Law Professors R. Polk Wagner & Joseph Scott Miller as Amici Curiae at 1, Phillips, 415 F.
3d 1303 (Nos, 03-1269, -1286) (“The Public Notice Function of Claims Requires a Focus on, and a
presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language.”) [hereinafter Wagner & Miller
Amici Brief].
145. Three amicus briefs favored looking to both the specification as well as dictionaries: ( 1 )
ABA Amicus Brief, supra note 23, at 2 (“Regarding the dictionary-versus-specification dispute, the
ABA supports a middle ground, whereby neither has primacy and both must be considered.”); (2)
Brief for Federal Circuit Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 2, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1269.-1286) (“We respectfully suggest that both sources may be
consulted, along with other intrinsic or extrinsic evidence that may be helpful, but the court should
not require [them] to be consulted in any particular order.”); (3) Brief for International Trade
Commission Trial Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party and Supporting
Neither Reversal nor Affirmance at 3, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(Nos. 03-1269 - 86) (“The public notice function of patent claims is better served by, whenever
possible, looking to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification, relevant technical
dictionaries and similar sources, and to general purpose dictionaries. . . .”) [hereinafter ITCTLA
Amicus Brief].
146. Three of the thirty-six briefs filed in the case did not address this issue. See generally
(1) Brief for Bar Ass’n of The District of Columbia - Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at i, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (Nos. 03-1269, -1286); (2) Brief for Consumers Union, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and
Public Knowledge as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Cross-Appellants at 1, Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1269, -1286); (3) Brief for Public Patent
Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Cross Appellants at i, Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1269,-1286).
147. While the amici curiae may not agree on the ultimate resolution of the first question,
they do seem to agree on at least four key points. First, when performing claim construction, the
courts must always begin and remain centered on the language of the claims. Johnson Worldwide
Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Jonathon R. Spivey,
The Federal Circuit’s Markman Jurisprudence – Patchwork Quilt or Jigsaw Puzzle? Is There
Really Panel-Dependency and Unpredictability in Federal Circuit Opinions?, in HOW TO
PREPARE & CONDUCT MARKMAN HEARINGS 2004, at 709, 715 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 2004). Second, public notice hinges
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the amici curiae: (l) a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary
meaning providing the best public notice,148 and (2) by looking first to
the specification, courts will reduce the amount of vexatious litigation.149
B. A Heavy Presumption in Favor of Dictionaries Provides the Best
Public Notice
A minority of amici curiae believes that public notice is best served
when courts look to dictionaries to construe patent claims.150
Interestingly enough, Professor Polk Wagner, one of the individuals who
originally chronicled the split of authority, is in this minority that favors
the procedural approach.151 He recommends that if the patent does not
provide “clear, specific, and objective evidence of the meaning of claim
language,”152 then the court should adopt a heavy presumption in favor
of the ordinary meaning of claim language.153
on the uniformity and predictability of claim construction. Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (stating that uniformity and certainty are necessary elements of the
public notice function); see also Parus Holdings Amicus Brief, supra note 144, at 2. Third, public
notice is best served when no litigation is required to interpret a patent’s terms. Wagner & Miller
Amici Brief, supra note 144, at 2 (“There can be no dispute that the public notice function is best
served when the meaning of claim language is readily apparent to patent readers.”). And fourth, the
patent document itself is the primary meaning for claim terms, specifically when the patentee acts
as his own lexicographer and defines a term used in the claims. Id.
148. See generally infra notes 150-184 and accompanying text (referring to the section
entitled “A Heavy Presumption in Favor of Dictionaries Provides the Best Notice”).
149. See generally infra notes 185-211 and accompanying text (referring to the Section entitled
“Look to the Specification”).
150. See supra, note 144 (listing four amicus briefs favoring the “procedural” approach).
151. See Wagner & Miller Amici Brief, supra note 144. However, note that although these
authors “concentrate their research . . . on legal and policy issues of the U.S. Patent Law,” they are
also “full-time academics” and likely have less day-to-day experience with patent prosecution and
litigation then authors of most of the other amicus briefs. See id. at v.
152. Wagner & Miller Amici Brief, supra note 144, at 3. Specifically, a definitional statement
such as “as used herein, the term X is understood to mean Y,” would be a clearly stated meaning of
the term “X,” and there would be no need to look to dictionaries. Id. at 3.
153. See Wagner & Miller Amici Brief, supra note 144, at 4-5 (stating, “Indeed, the court
should continue with its established trend of adopting a heavy presumption in favor of the
ordinary meaning of claim language . . . .”); see also Parus Holdings Amicus Brief, supra note
144, at 4 (“[U]nless a patentee has acted as his or her own lexicographer or has expressly
disavowed the scope of the claim during prosecution, using dictionaries to ascertain all possible
meanings and then using the specification to select the proper meaning(s) will result in better
predictability . . . .”); cf. Cabnell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.,
commenting in the statutory context) (“It is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have
some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest
guide to their meaning.”). The purpose of patents is to disclose the invention. Michael S.
Connor & John A. Waslef, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical Examination of Existing Claim
Construction Doctrine, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 878, 879 (2004).
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1. Supreme Court Precedent and Dictionaries
To understand how the Federal Circuit should engage in claim
construction, it is useful to look at how recent Supreme Court precedent
deals with dictionaries and apply that reasoning to claim construction in
the Federal Circuit.154 To that end, seven majority opinions of the
October 2003 term of the Supreme Court used one or more dictionaries
to interpret language.155 Four of those opinions involved statutory
construction,156 one involved a constitutional provision,157 and the two
others were some other binding legal text.158 Indeed, scholars have
noted that there has been a 37.2 percent increase in the use of
dictionaries in the court system from 1994 to 2003.159 As modern courts
154. For an excellent discussion of the use of dictionaries at the patent office and the courts, see
Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles & Rules for Dictionaries at the
Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829. The U.S. Supreme Court often quotes from
both law dictionaries and general purpose English dictionaries in its opinions. Id. at 831. Just
less than ten-percent (9.6%) of the Supreme Court’s decisions in its October 2003 term utilized
one or more dictionaries to interpret language of various legal instruments. Id. “The most
comprehensive study of the Supreme Court’s reliance on dictionaries . . . is the magisterial Samuel
A. Thumma & Jeffrey Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999).” Id. at 832. The “existing
literature on the deeper normative question - is it sound to use dictionaries to help establish a word's
ordinary meaning? - is substantial.” Id. at 836 n.24. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:
Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Clark D. Cunningham et
al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994); Craig Hoffman, Parse the
Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (2003); Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning: Law
Dictionaries and the Liberal Tradition of Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257 (2000); Aaron J.
Rynd, Dictionaries and the Interpretation of Words: A Summary of Difficulties, 29 A LBERTA
L. R EV . 712 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ; and Lawrence M. Solan, Learning our Limits: The Decline of Textualism
in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L.REV. 235.
155. Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 154, at 831.
156. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 100 & n.3 (2004) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 117
(7th ed. 1999) in interpreting the term “assessment”); Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541
U.S. 369, 383 & nn.15-16 (2004) (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 96 (4th ed. 2000),
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 138 (revised 4th ed. 1968), and OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 629
(2d.ed 1989) in interpreting “arising under”); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252-53 (2004); United States v, Galletti, 542 U.S. 114, 122 (2004) (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (7th ed. 1999) in interpreting the term “assessment”).
157. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004).
158. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 651 & n.6 (2004) (citing AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 10 (4th ed. 2000), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 15 (6th ed. 1990), and
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 8 (4th ed. 1999) in support of its construction of
the term “accident”); Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 62 n.2 (2003) (utilizing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1586 (7th ed. 1999) to define “low-water mark”).
159. Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note l54, at 832. The authors arrived at this increase by
performing a search (specifically using the search term “dictionary /6 (“webster’s” or “american
heritage” or “random house” or college or collegiate or concise or unabridged or oxford”) in
Westlaw’s allfeds database, and recording the number of hits annually. Id. at n.9. In 1994, 537
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favor dictionaries in other cases of statutory construction,160 a threshold
question is whether principles of statutory construction should guide
claim construction in patent cases.
Some scholars suggest that the quid pro quo involved in obtaining a
patent does not lend itself to principles of statutory construction, but
rather to principles of contract law.161 These scholars might argue, by
analogy, that courts should construe any ambiguous language in a
patent’s claims against the patentee.162 However, others contend that
interpreting a patent’s claims is more analogous to statutory
construction.163 In so doing, the court should try to determine the intent
of the drafters and can consider the internal consistency of the document
as a whole.164
hits were recorded. Id. In 2003 there were 737 hits. Id.
160. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text (discussing the use of dictionaries in the
modern court system).
161. One scholar who suggests that courts should use contract principles to interpret patent
claims is M. Aminthe Broussard. See M. Aminthe Broussard, Ambivalence in Equivalents:
Problems and Solutions for Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents, 64 LA. L. REV. 119, 136-37.
“A patent is a contract, so courts should interpret it using the traditional common law rules of
contract interpretation.” Id. at 136. Broussard suggests that “[non-technical] words in patent
claims should be given their ordinary, common meaning[,] and technical words [should be given]
their technical meaning.” Id. She feels that because patent claims are analogous to contract terms,
courts should adhere to the notion that ambiguous terms in a patent’s claim should be construed
against the drafter. Id. Charlie Lisherness has further noted that from a historical perspective, the
U.S. patent system is based on an analogy to contract theory. Charlie Lisherness, Notes and
Comments, Patent Reissue Genus Claims: Harmful Evolution, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 85, 91
(2003).
162. See Broussard, supra note 161, at 136 (noting that contracts are generally construed against
the drafter).
163. One scholar advocating a statutory-construction-type methodology is Gretchen Ann
Bender. See Gretchen Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is
Ripe For a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175 (2001). Bender
notes that the Federal Circuit has rejected the theory that a patent is similar to a contract. Id. at 196
(citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985). She goes on to note that the
majority in Markman analogized claim interpretation to statutory construction, which is a matter
of law strictly for the court. Id. (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 985). Patents, like statutes, are
enforceable against the public, unlike private agreements between contacting parties. Id. As
such, the patentee’s subjective intent as to the meaning of the claims is not at issue and the focus
is on what a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood
the term to mean. Id. Claim construction based on principles of statutory construction is the
currently preferred theory. Markman, 52 F.3d at 987.
164. Wilson R. Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36 GONZ. L.
REV. 433, 441 (2001). “Textual analysis looks to the language used in the legal document under
review, whether it is a constitution, a statute, a regulation, a contract, or a will.” Id. “Intratextual
arguments are . . . a powerful technique for interpreting statutes.” Id. at n.37. In this technique,
one part of the document is used to give meaning to another part. Id. at 442. E.g., McCulIoch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheaton) 316, 414-15 (1819); Dunnigan v. First Bank, 585 A.2d 659, 663
(Conn. 1991).
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The statutory approach has won out in the modern claim
construction context.165 Moreover, some scholars have suggested that
recent Federal Circuit rulings could find support for adopting a
procedural approach that favors dictionaries.166 Indeed, at least one Federal
Circuit judge has reiterated the fact that the Supreme Court has arguably
stated that dictionaries are the place to start in statutory construction.167
If courts continue to look to dictionary definitions when no explicit
definition is set forth in the patent instrument and hold steadfastly to
those definitions, the claims themselves may provide better public
notice.168 Such a position seems strongly rooted in the Supreme Court’s
statutory construction methodology, and the Federal Circuit should give
it serious consideration in determining whether to look to dictionaries or
the specification in claim construction.
2. Shortcomings
If the court had followed this procedural approach, perhaps the
biggest obstacle would have been setting forth a methodology to

165. Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (rejecting the theory that a patent is similar to a contract).
166. See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 154, at app. b, tbl.6. The Federal Circuit has relied
on general purpose dictionaries more than twice as often as more technical or specialized reference
works. Id. The claim construction reference work cited most often by the Federal Circuit is
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Id. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
accounts for twenty-five percent of all citations in claim construction rulings at the Federal Circuit.
Id. Moreover, on his website devoted to patent claim construction, Professor R. Polk Wagner
notes the following trend after the decision to rehear Phillips:
1. Since the Phillips en banc order was issued on July 21, 2004, the court has decided
87% of claim construction cases using the procedural methodology. Compare this to the
overall 65% procedural average. Note that the ‘n’ here is just 23 opinions, so it may well
be an anomaly. Nonetheless, it will be interesting to see whether this is a harbinger of
the resolution of the issues in Phillips.
2. Thus far in 2004, the court has issued 85 claim construction opinions, with 75% of
them being procedural in nature.
3. Note that almost 30% of the claim construction cases at the Federal Circuit in 2004
have contained an ‘“alternative” opinion - a concurrence or dissent.
Claimconstruction.com: A Research Project on the Interpretation of Patent Language, available at
http://www.claimconstruction.com/ (last visited on January 20, 2005).
167. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 114, at 7 (where a judge queried, “The Supreme
Court in statutory construction says to start with the dictionary?”).
168. Wagner & Miller Amici Brief, supra note 144, at 2; see Ruoyu Roy Wang, Texas Digital
Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward a More Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153, 170-71 (2004) (“[Formalism] gradually reduces courts’ interpretive
burdens and mistakes, increases interpretive accuracy and predictability, and encourages a norm
formation for patent drafting.”); see also id. at 169-70 (“Formalism . . . advances the public notice
function more because it predictably emphasizes the meanings of claims within the four corners of
a patent.”).
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determine which dictionary definition should govern.169 In looking to
dictionary definitions, one source of confusion is the various definitions
available for any given word.170 The multiple definitions makes it
impossible to predict with any confidence which meaning a court will
choose for a given term in a patent’s claims.171
Another possible shortcoming would have been the USPTO
examiners’ infrequent use of dictionaries.172 Although the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) promotes the use of dictionaries,173
examiners do not use them as practical matter.174 Thus, if courts adopt a
169. See, e.g., Paul Katz & Robert Riddle, Designing Around a United States Patent, 45 S.
TEX. L. REV. 647, 654 (2004) ( “[W]ords often have multiple dictionary definitions, some of which
have no relation to the claimed invention, the intrinsic record must always be consulted to identify
which of the different possible dictionary meanings of the claim terms in issue is most consistent
with the use of the words by the inventor.”) (citing Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical,
Inc., 326 F.3d 1215,1221 (Fed. Cir 2003), reh’g granted in part, 334 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Multiform
Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). This suggests that if more
than one dictionary definition is consistent with the use of the words in the intrinsic record, the
claim terms may be construed to encompass all such consistent meanings. Id.
170. See AlphaDictionary.com, available at http://www.alphadictionary.com/index.shtml (last
visited May 14, 2006) (allowing users to search 992 on-line dictionaries); OneLook Dictionary Search,
available at http://www.onelook.com (last visited May 14, 2006) (also searching 992 online
dictionaries and 186 on-line technical dictionaries).
171. IBM Amicus Brief, supra note 143, at 3. However, other scholars have suggested that
trends do exist and as such, it is more likely that the Federal Circuit will look to some dictionaries
more than others. See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 154, at app. b tbl.6. The Federal Circuit
has relied on general purpose dictionaries more than twice as often as it has relied on more
technical or specialized reference works. Id. Moreover, the Federal Circuit does have a dictionary
that it cites more often than any other, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Id.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary accounts for twenty-five percent of all citations in
claim construction rulings at the Federal Circuit. Id.
172. See Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 114, at 6.
173. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEPT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 1605, ¶ 16.10 (8th ed. Rev 2, 2004) (“Where color is a distinctive
feature of the plant, the color should be positively identified in the specification by reference to a
designated color as given by a recognized color dictionary or color chart”) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter MPEP]; id. at § 2105 (“[T]his Court has read the term ‘manufacture’ in § 101 in
accordance with its dictionary definition . . . .”) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty 447 U.S. 303,
308 (1980); id. at § 2106 (yielding to THE NEW IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF ELECTRICAL
AND ELECTRONICS TERMS 308 (5th ed. 1993)); id. at § 2106 (referring to the COMPUTER
DICTIONARY 210 (Microsoft Press, 2d ed. 1994)); id. at § 2111.01 (repeatedly referring to
dictionaries and plain meaning); id. at § 2173.05(a) (“It is appropriate to compare the meaning of
terms given in technical dictionaries in order to ascertain the accepted meaning of a term in the
art.”). Note, however, that the MPEP does not have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title
37 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at Foreword (“This manual is published to provide . . .
(USPTO) patent examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents, and representatives of applicants with a
reference work on . . . the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO[;]. . . [it] does
not have the force of law. . . .”).
174. See Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 114, at 6 (“It’s a training issue, typically [patent
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methodology favoring dictionaries in claim construction, this might
conflict with current real-world practices of the USPTO (or viceversa).175
3. Conclusion as to the Minority Position
Because uncertainty is inherent in the judiciary choosing a
dictionary, and because the USPTO fails to use consistent definitions in
the patent prosecution process, a presumption in favor of dictionaries
might have led to a patent’s claims becoming overly broad. There are
two replies to this contention.
First, patentees should have to specify which dictionary
governs.176 Such a solution arguably makes sense from an economic
perspective.177 However, this solution fails to address how to deal with
examiners] don’t use [dictionaries].”).
175. It’s unclear, however, whether this distinction between USPTO practice and realities of
litigation would cause real world concern. One possible counterargument is that if the court did
adopt such a methodology, the USPTO should simply conform its procedures to be in accordance
with the decision. See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 154, at 847-48 (opining that the Patent
Commissioner has the power to promulgate dictionaries if such a rule is procedural). Thus, to the
extent that declaring a dictionary is a procedural methodology, the Patent Commission should have
the power to require every practitioner to state on the face of the application what publicly available
general purpose and specialized dictionaries she wants the office to use in the event it needs help to
construe her claims. Id. at 886. Since the MPEP as a whole is only persuasive authority, this is a
plausible outcome. See MPEP, supra note 173, at Foreword (stating that the MPEP does not have
the force of law).
176. Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 154, at 887 (proposing the Patent Office require
“patentees to provide controlling express definitions for any claim terms in the body of the patent”).
Such a solution would provide clarity in constructing terms, but what would courts do with patents
that are currently issued and do not specify which dictionary to look to?
177. See id. at 897. In the article, the authors assume that requiring patent attorneys to look to
dictionaries would increase the time associated with preparing a patent application. Id. at 897.
These costs would then be passed onto the client. Id. They then assume that selecting a proper
dictionary (or other reference source) will increase the average preparation cost of the patent by
1%, or $93.32 per application. Id. at 898. Ultimately, they find that the total cost (given the fact
that the PTO receives just over 330,000 utility patent applications a year) due to a patent attorney
having to consult a dictionary, would be $22,172,832. Id. at 899. Miller and Hilsenteger then
contend that such added costs make financial sense. Id. Their argument for this costeffectiveness goes as follows: (1) the national median cost of a full patent trial is $4 million, (2)
given that 1,600 utility patent infringement cases are filed a year, and (3) that 95 of those are fully
tried, (4) it seems likely that six of those trials would be avoided and thus the money saved (more
than $24 million) would be greater than the money spent in the extra prosecution. See id.
However, one might argue that such a system shifts the added cost of litigation from the
government (i.e., taxpayers) to individual clients. See Jennifer Gordon, Preparing and
Prosecuting a Patent that Holds Up in Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION 2004, at 991, 1043 (PLI
Patent, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 2004). In the
somewhat analogous situation of claim amendments in light of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku
Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), scholars have urged that the additional prosecution
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patents that have already issued and that do not designate a dictionary in
the specification.178 The courts should accordingly rely on dictionary
experts to specify which dictionaries a court should consider in
construing a patent’s claims.
Second, three statutory provisions of the Patent Act prevent claims
from being broader than what the inventor is entitled to claim.179
Section 102 limits the claims of the present invention from
encompassing that which already exists in the prior art.180 Similarly,
section 103 only allows the claims of the present invention to include
subject matter that is non-obvious in light of the prior art.181 Lastly, and
costs of “carefully laying out exactly what was surrendered and/or what was not surrendered by
amendment” is worth the added cost. See id.
178. See supra notes 154-60 (discussing the various dictionaries that courts have used in
interpreting language, whether that language be statutory, constitutional, claim construction related,
or something else altogether). Note that although courts may favor certain dictionaries, courts have
not selected an “official” dictionary. See id. Moreover, various technical dictionaries are used in
construing a patent’s claims, and these dictionaries are specific to the subject matter of the claimed
invention. See MPEP, supra note 173, at § 2106 (referring examiners to both The New IEEE
Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms as well as the Computer Dictionary). It
seems that if a court were to choose one dictionary, it would categorically exclude all other
technical dictionaries.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003); and 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
180. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(a) the invention was
known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant.”). Accordingly, if the applicant’s
claims are anticipated by a prior art reference, the USPTO will deny the applicant a patent. See
id.
181. 35 U.S.C. § 103. The relevant portion reads as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The Supreme Court further defined this statutory provision in the classic
case of Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). Under Graham, four factual inquiries
are used as a background for determining obviousness as follows: (1) determining the scope and
contents of the prior art; (2) ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue; (3) resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) evaluating evidence of secondary
considerations. MPEP, supra note 173, at § 2100-120. Furthermore, in Hodosh v. Block Drug Co.,
Inc., the Federal Circuit went on to hold that the following tenets must also be adhered to: (1) “the
claimed invention must be considered as a whole”; (2) “the references must be considered as a
whole and must suggest the desirability and thus the obviousness of making the combination;” (3)
“the references must be viewed without the benefit of impermissible hindsight vision afforded by
the claimed invention”; and (4) reasonable expectation of success is the standard with which
obviousness is determined. 786 F.2d 1136, 1143 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Furthermore, an examiner
must determine what is “analogous prior art” for the purpose of analyzing the obviousness of the
subject matter at issue. MPEP, supra note 173, at § 2100-122. In determining what is analogous
prior art, the court has found “the similarities and differences in structure and function of the
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perhaps most significantly, section 112 requires that the specification
must be enabling of the subject matter in the claims and that it must
disclose the best mode of the invention.182 For example, if the patentee
does not sufficiently disclose the claimed invention in the specification
to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
invention, then the court will strike down those claims as void.183
Moreover, the court could adopt a rule stating that if two plausible
constructions exist, “the narrower should be chosen as a penalty for the
patentee’s drafting ambiguity.”184 As such, these requirements should
keep an inventor from claiming more than he or she has actually
invented.
C. Look to the Specification
1. Specification Should Govern
The majority of amici curiae favor the “holistic” approach because
they feel that looking to dictionaries will confuse claim interpretations.
They argue that reading the claims in the context of the specification
better serves the public notice function because “it gives both the
patentee and competitors a single source to look to in order to understand
the scope of the invention.”185 Moreover, “[t]he specification and
invention to carry far greater weight.” In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 1372 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
182. 35. U.S.C. § 112 (2005). The relevant portion reads:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most closely
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
183. See In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“The function of the requirement
is to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the
specific subject matter later claimed by him.”). This section “seeks to guard against unreasonable
advantages to the patentee and disadvantage to others arising from uncertainly as to their rights.”
United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232 (1942).
184. Veenker, supra note 64, at 37.
185. IBM Amicus Brief, supra note 143, at 12. While this is true for issued patents and
published applications, the same does not hold true for pending applications that are not published.
See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000) (entitled “Confidential status of applications; publication of patent
applications”). Under these statutory provisions, pending applications are kept in confidence by
the Patent and Trademark Office, and no information concerning the application status can be given
without authority of the applicant unless disclosure is necessary to carry out the provisions of an Act
of Congress or in special circumstances, as determined by the Director of the PTO. § 122(a).
Applications for patents are generally published promptly after 18 months from the earliest filing
date, unless the applicant abandons the application, or certifies that the invention will not be the
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prosecution history are a public record available to all without the need
for litigation.”186 Furthermore, the holistic approach is consistent with
statutory provisions187 and may be more consistent with principles of
statutory construction.188
2. Shortcomings
At first, it appears difficult to reconcile the majority’s viewpoint
with the oft-stated proposition that it is the claims that delineate the
“metes and bounds” of the invention. One might argue that the proper
claim construction methodology should focus on the terms of a patent’s
claims, thus implying that courts should focus on the definitions of those
terms.189 Indeed, if claim construction is analogous to statutory
construction,190 one might argue that ignoring the language of the
claims is analogous to interpreting a statutory provision such that it is
without effect. That is a position that courts repeatedly eschew.191
subject of an application filed in another country. § 122(b).
186. IBM Amicus Brief, supra note 143, at 3. Because current patents do not require the drafter to
specify a particular dictionary definition, litigation may be required to find out exactly which
dictionary would be used to construe the claims. Cf. supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text
(suggesting that patentees should specify which dictionary a court should use to construe its
claims).
187. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1). That provision states:
The claim or claims must conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder
of the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support
or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims
may be ascertainable by reference to the description.
Id. (emphasis added).
188. Cf. infra note 191 (arguing that ignoring the language of the specification is analogous to
interpreting a statute to render its provisions without effect).
189. See MCJOHN, supra note 71, at 173-74 (opining that “in particular, there is a widely
noted tension between interpreting the claims by using the written description (allowed) and reading
limitations from the description into the claims (not allowed)”). Some Federal Circuit panels have
gone so far as to hold explicitly that courts should give the words of a claim the full range of their
ordinary meaning. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1999). In CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., the court noted that if an apparatus claim recites a
general structure without limiting that structure to a specific subset of structures, a court will
generally construe the term to cover all known types of that structure that the patent disclosure
supports. 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per
Azioni 158 F3d. 1243, 1250). The court held that dictionaries may establish ordinary meaning, so
long as the definition does not “fly in the face” of the patent disclosure. Id.
190. Claim construction is analogous to statutory construction under the modern school of
thought. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (rejecting the theory that a
patent is similar to a contract).
191. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Devon Bank, 832 F.2d 1005,
1008 (7th Cir. 1987) (“It is not beyond belief that statutes contain meaningless provisions, but a
court should treat statutory words as dross only when there is no alternative.”). In the analogous
arena of constitutional interpretation, John Marshall noted, “It cannot be presumed that any clause
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Nonetheless, the Phillips court is not, in reality, contemplating such a
drastic approach. Rather it is seeking only to interpret the terms of the
claims. While the court may give weight to the specification in
interpreting such terms, it will clearly not go so far as to state that the
specification defines the property right.192
3. A New Policy-Based Argument
Because large corporations own the majority of patents,193 one
might intuitively think that they would want broader claims (i.e., favor
looking to dictionaries)194 because such claims would provide them a
greater property right. However, the majority of the amici curiae seem
to take the opposite approach.195 Corporations in particular are
requesting narrower claims.196
In attempting to understand why large corporations might be
requesting narrower claims, it is interesting to first note that studies have
shown that large companies (particularly in specific industries) are less
likely to enforce patents through litigation.197 Typically, as large
in the constitution is intended to be without effect. . . .” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 174 (1803).
192. See Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 989 (determining that when performing claim
construction, the courts must always begin and remain centered on the language of the claims); see
also Spivey, supra note 147, at 989 (discussing this proposition in more detail).
193. John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley. Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration
of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000). A study of 1,000 random patents
issued by the USPTO across all fields of invention between mid-1996 and mid-1998 showed that
small businesses (500 employees or fewer) owned 10.7 percent of patents. John R. Allison &
Emerson H. Tiller, Internet Business Method Patents, available at http://utopia.utexas.edu/articles/
tbr/business_patents.html (last visited January 30, 2005). Comparatively, large entities owned 70.7
percent of patents. Id.
194. See supra notes 124-25 (discussing how looking to dictionary definitions may lead to
broader claims).
195. See supra note 143 (suggesting that twenty-five of the thirty-six briefs filed do not favor
looking to the dictionary, but instead favor looking to the specification).
196. Compare supra note 143 (illustrating that the following corporate entities favored the
“holistic approach”: Association of Corporate Council; Biotechnology Industry Organization;
Infineon; Intel, IBM, Google, Micron, and Microsoft; Medrad, Inc.; Novartis Pharmaceuticals; and
Visa USA, Mentat, Inc.) with supra notes 124-25 (detailing how dictionary definitions may yield a
broader claim interpretation).
197. Allison et al., supra note 133, at 438. Moreover, ninety-nine percent of patent owners
do not file suit to enforce their rights. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office,
95 NW.U. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2001). Based on the fact that specific industries are more likely to
enforce patents through litigation, some scholars have urged that patents in specific industries are
far more likely to be valuable than patents in other industries. Allison et al, supra note 133, at
474. For example, drug, medicine, computer, and communication patents are much more likely to
be litigated than mechanical, chemical, electrical, and electronic patents. Id. at 472. In a more
detailed study, it was found that medical devices, computer-related inventions, software,
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companies in well-established industries grow, they build large patent
portfolios.198 Eventually, as the final consumer product grows in
complexity, each company owns numerous patents relating to the ultimate
consumer product.199 These patents are known as “blocking patents.”200
Such “blocking patents” often divide the ownership rights in the ultimate
product to such an extent that they force the competing corporations to
agree to royalty-free cross licenses.201 This keeps firms without large
patent portfolios from entering the market.202 As such, large companies in
established fields have little to gain from entering patent litigation,
because competing firms have similar patents that they would assert in
counterclaims.203 Thus, generally speaking, a very small number of
patents actually have value for large corporations.204
electronics, and mechanical patents are significantly more likely to be litigated than the average of
all patents. Id. Therefore, these more litigated patents are more valuable. See id. at 474 & n.163.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many companies who have these “valuable patents” have filed amicus
briefs in this case. See supra note 143 (noting that IBM, Infineon, Norvatis Pharmaceuticals, as
well as several other large corporations have filed amicus briefs). These large companies with
“‘valuable patents” prefer looking to the specification and as such prefer a narrower claim
construction. See supra note 143 (noting the above corporations feel the specification should be
the primary source of claim construction).
198. See Top 10 Private Sector Patent Recipients for 2004, available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/speeches/05-03.htm (last visited January 30, 2005). The following ten large
corporations in established industries had the most patents in 2004 (numbers in brackets are
preliminary number of patents in 2004): (1) IBM, Corp [3,248]; (2) Matsushita Electrical Industrial
Co, Ltd [1,934]; (3) Canon Kabushiki Kaisha [1,805]; (4) Hewlett-Packard Development, Co.
[1,775]; (5) Micron Technology, Inc. [1,760]; (6) Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. [1,604]; Intel Corp.
[1,601]; Hitachi, Ltd [1,514]; Toshiba Corp [1,310]; Sony Corp. [1,305]. Id.
199. See Allison et al, supra note 133, at 468-69.
200. See generally Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) (discussing blocking patents and
focusing on their impact on the reverse doctrine of equivalents); see also Richard J. Gilbert, The
Road Less Traveled: Arbitrating Antitrust Claim Special Feature: Development in International
Competition Law: Converging Doctrines? U.S. and EU Antitrust Policy for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, 19 ANTITRUST 51, 54 (Fall 2004) (discussing blocking patents in the context
of the microprocessor industry, where more than 24,000 patents have issued since 1976).
201. Allison et al, supra note 133, at 468-69.
202. See Gilbert, supra note 200, at 54 (opining that unless a firm in the microprocessor
industry can obtain a large patent portfolio, it is unable to enter (or stay in) the microprocessor
market because of the plethora of patents covering the technology).
203. See Allison et al, supra note 133, at 468-69 (referring to such litigation as “mutually
assured destruction”).
204. For example, IBM performed an internal patent study a few years ago and determined that
of 10,000 patents that it studied, only 40 had “real value.” James E. White, The U.S. First-toInvent System, the Mossinghoff Conclusion, . . . and Statistics, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 357, 362 (2003). However, those few patents that do have “real value” generate
phenomenal revenues. Id. at 362-63 (noting that the revenue from the forty patents with “real
value” was in excess of $1.6 billion, while the cost to obtain the patents was “in the mere
millions”).
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While large corporations may not have much to gain from broader
claims, they have plenty to lose. As stated above, if broader claims
ensue, large companies are not likely to enforce those patent claims on
smaller companies or independent inventors. However, the opposite
does not hold true. Small companies and individual inventors are more
likely to enforce patents than large companies are. These individual
inventors and small companies are often non-manufacturing shops that
do not produce products.205 Because these small entities do not
manufacture products, large companies cannot assert their patents
against them because there is no infringement. If Phillips would have
determined that dictionaries are the primary source for claim
interpretation, broader claims would have ensued, leaving individuals
and small companies more room to assert broad claims. Thus, these
small companies would have been more likely to initiate litigation with
the larger, more successful corporations. This would have rewarded the
unsuccessful firms in the marketplace, because they are the ones
without products of their own against which others could assert
patents.206 The Phillips court widely side-stepped this result by keeping
the primary focus of claim construction on the intrinsic evidence.207
The corporations that submitted amicus briefs have deep pockets
and may fear smaller corporations initiating vexatious litigation.208
205. Allison et al, supra note 133, at 469. Indeed, one current business strategy is that large
companies may transfer their patents to holding companies, permitting the holding company (which
does not sell or produce product, and as such cannot infringe another’s patent) to license or enforce
the patents while insulating the large company from infringement counterclaims. Id. at 469.
Coincidently (or perhaps not), one of the amicus briefs that favors looking to the dictionary is from
a holding company. See Parus Holdings Amicus Brief, supra note 144. Parus Holdings, Inc. is a
“small research-oriented company” that seeks to assert its patents on other companies via litigation,
license its patents, and otherwise raise funds from its patent portfolio. See id. at 1. Another amicus
curiae that suggests looking to the dictionary is McShea Tecce & Duffy & Keenam. See McShea
Tecce Amici Brief, supra note 144. This amicus curiae identifies itself as “dedicated to the
representation of individuals and small entities in connection with IP-rights.” Id. at iv. When these
briefs are looked at together, they arguably add credence to the amici curiae who favor looking to
the specification: if the court looks to dictionaries as a primary source of claim interpretation, then
small companies (who own patents but produce few or no products) will seek to enforce their
patents against large companies that are successful in the marketplace.
206. Infringement of a patent generally requires that an unauthorized party “makes, uses, offers
to sell or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).
Accordingly, in a case where a small, research based firm holds patents but does not make, use, sell
or import products, the firm cannot be held to infringe a patent. See id.
207. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18 (subrogating dictionaries to a role that is “less significant
than the intrinsic record,” which includes the language of the claims, the specification, and the
prosecution history).
208. E.g., IBM Corp. has a market capitalization of $131.66 billion; Google has a market
capitalization of $64.96 billion; Micron Technology, Inc. has a market capitalization of $7.81
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Nonetheless, if the previous interpretation is correct, it suggests that
courts and scholars must rethink the traditional understanding that
patents are a means for inventors to exclude competitors.209 Under such a
view, patents owned by large corporations look like a socially wasteful
expense made only because other large corporations also invest in such
patents.210
4. Conclusion as to Majority Opinion
While the majority’s viewpoint has some merit, in many cases, such
an approach does not give sufficient deference to dictionaries.211 As
such, it cannot carry the day and the court must find a better solution.
D. Suggestion - Include Dictionaries as Intrinsic Evidence
Although the first Phillips question is phrased as an “either-or”
proposition,212 the court’s ultimate ruling was correct in not limiting its
final holding.213 To resolve the tension in Phillips, the Federal Circuit
wisely allowed courts to look to dictionaries and to the specification in
order to construe claims accurately.214
This can be accomplished by looking to the dictionary in the
context of the specification.215 Such a balanced approach provides
patent holders a presumption that their claims have a broad plain

billion; and Microsoft Corp. has a market capitalization of $264.14 billion. New York Stock
Exchange, available at http://www.nyse.com (last visited on October 23, 2005).
209. Allison et al, supra note 133, at 469.
210. Id. Cf Teresa Riordan, Patents: Some Pharmaceutical Companies Pay $25 Million for
Nonexclusive Rights to the New AIDS Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1996, at 2 (reporting an
extremely broad (and valuable) patent that had not issued yet: Vertex Pharmaceuticals and Glaxo
Wellcome jointly paid $25 million to G.D. Searle for a non-exclusive license to what the company
contended would be a broad patent, because the patent related to a new type of drug that showed
considerable promise in fighting AIDS).
211. See infra notes 212-225 (offering that courts should look to dictionaries in the context of the
specification).
212. See supra note 86 (listing the seven questions certified for rehearing in Phillips).
213. See, e.g., Bradley Amicus Brief, supra note 143, at 4 (“Ordaining either dictionaries or
patent specifications to be controlling authorities in all situations is to impose a straightjacket on the
mind’s eye.”); Mion Amicus Brief, supra note 143, at 3 (“A patent, its prosecution history, and
general and technical dictionaries are all sources for claim construction.”) (emphasis added).
214. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322, 1315 (stating “we do not intend to preclude the appropriate
use of dictionaries”, and “[t]he best source for understanding a technical term is the specification
from which it arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history,” respectively). ABA Amicus
Brief, supra note 23, at 2 (supporting a “middle ground”); see also ITCTLA Amicus Brief, supra
note 145, at 3 (favoring looking to both the specification and dictionaries).
215. See supra note 213.
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meaning.216 Because a person of ordinary skill in the art would read the
claims with the dictionary they “carry in their heads,” a dictionary
definition is a natural starting point for claim construction.217 However,
it would be “misguided and self-contradictory” to detach that meaning
from the context of the patent instrument itself.218 In effect, courts
should look both to dictionaries and to the specification in construing
claims.219
Court cases indicate that the Federal Circuit may be elevating the
use of dictionaries to the level of intrinsic evidence, or perhaps to an
even more fundamental level.220 By raising dictionaries to the level of
intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit could leave the existing claim
construction methodology in place,221 and at the same time find a way to
allow patentees to argue that the claims are entitled to broad protection.
A court should refuse to give the patentee the full scope of his
claims in four cases. The first two limitations are based on intrinsic
evidence: (1) if the specification does enable the full scope of the claims,
the court should strike down each non-enabled claim under 35 U.S.C §

216. Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix. Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The
terms used in the claims bear a ‘heavy presumption’ that they mean what they say and have the
ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.”).
217. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 114, at 6. The full exchange at oral arguments was
as follows: “Clevenger: Don’t the examiners [who are people of ordinary skill in the art] carry
dictionaries in their heads? [Whealan (representing the U.S. government)] A: Yes, but they all have
different dictionaries. Examiners have specialized knowledge. . . .” Id.
218. Nard, supra note 18, at 82 (“[T]his overly formalistic approach and acontextual approach
is misguided and self-contradictory.”). A purely procedural view “proclaims to read the claim
language as a person of ordinary skill in the art would, but . . . eschews the use of extrinsic
evidence, thus distancing itself” from the parties that its interpretation will ultimately affect. Id. If
courts put too much of their own judgment in choosing the relevant dictionary (or if they fail to
look at extrinsic evidence), the incentives to improve or design around a claim will disappear
because the claim’s boundaries are not commonly understood. Id.
219. See supra notes 213-214.
220. See Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1122 (2004). In Bilstad, the Federal Circuit
upheld the Board’s construction of the term “plurality.” Id. In agreeing with the Board’s
construction, the court agreed with the Board’s methodology, which is as follows: ( 1 ) look to a
dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning of the term, (2) then look to the written description
for context in ascertaining the meaning the term, (3) determine if the disclosure is consistent with
the dictionary definition, (4) and construe the term to encompass all consistent definitions. Id. In
such a methodology, courts look to dictionaries before looking to the written description. See id.
As such, dictionaries cannot be considered extrinsic evidence, which is considered only after
looking at the claims and all intrinsic evidence. See id. Accordingly, dictionaries must be either
intrinsic evidence or must be indicative of a more fundamental aspect of patent claims. See id.
221. See supra notes 66-69 (discussing how Vitronics set forth a general claim construction
analysis). Note that if dictionaries are moved from extrinsic evidence to intrinsic evidence, the
basic doctrine does not need to change. See supra notes 66-69.
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112,222 and (2) the patentee can explicitly limit the scope of the claims
by the written description portion of the specification by acting as his
own lexicographer.223 The third and fourth limitations are based on
extrinsic evidence: (3) the claim can be limited by the scope of the prior
art,224 and (4) experts should be allowed to testify as to the meaning that
a person of ordinary skill in the art would ascribe to the claims.225
V. CONCLUSION
Because industry fortunes rise and fall on how courts interpret
patent claims, there is no more important issue in patent law than
claim construction. Phillips will no doubt change the landscape of
222. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 343 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1145 n.20
(S.D. Fla., 2004). See also In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nat’l Recovery
Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
223. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“When a patentee acts as his own lexicographer in redefining the meaning of particular claim
terms away from their ordinary meaning, he must clearly express that intent in the written
description.”); see also Bell Atlanta Network Servs. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The statement in the written description must have sufficient clarity to
put a person of ordinary skill in the art on notice that the inventor intended to redefine the claim
term. See Merck 395 F.3d at 1370; see also Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Sci. Int’l, Inc., 214
F.3d 1302, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Absent an express intent to impart a novel meaning, claim terms
take on their ordinary meaning.”); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243,
1249 (“The patentee’s lexicography must, of course, appear ‘with reasonable clarity, deliberateness,
and precision’ before it can affect the claim.”); Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“This ‘heavy presumption’ in favor of the
claim term’s ordinary meaning is overcome, however, if a different meaning is clearly and
deliberately set forth in the intrinsic evidence.”).
224. Patents are presumptively valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2005). This presumption of validity is
largely to “protect the inventive contribution of patentees, even when the drafting of their patents
has been less than ideal.” Exxon Research and Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The “presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 carries with it a presumption
that the patent examiner did his duty and knew what claims he was allowing.” Intervet America,
Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Thus, a party challenging the
validity of a patent has an especially large burden when the prior art was before the examiner during
the prosecution of the application. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464,
1467 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
225. Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 202, 205 (7th Cir. 1982). The skill of a person
of ordinary skill in the art is a factual question. Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713
F.2d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
We hold only that an invention may be held to have been either obvious (or nonobvious)
without a specific finding of a particular level of skill or the reception of expert
testimony on the level of skill, where, as here, the prior art itself reflects an appropriate
level and need for such expert testimony has not been shown.
Id. at n.2. Ordinarily, the level of skill in the art is established through expert testimony of those
familiar with the art and the patent at issue. Id. But see Markman v. Lehman, 987 F.Supp. 36
(D.D.C. 1997) aff’d, 178 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that expert testimony regarding the
level of skill is unnecessary because the prior art itself reflects the level of skill).
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claim construction in patent law and have a direct impact on every
United States patent. Although the amicus briefs show a significant
preference for favoring the specification over dictionary definitions,
the question that they address was written as an “either-or”
proposition. When the Federal Circuit addressed this matter, it wisely
ignored its own “either-or” proposition, and adopted a balanced
approach. This solution yields to the realities of how a person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand a patent’s claims.
David Potashnik
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